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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
According to Toksöz (2009), the state of international affairs during the Cold War 
period was defined as “bipolar stability.” Since then, former communist countries have 
repositioned themselves in international affairs, and a transition has taken place from a 
bipolar structure to a unipolar one. This change has been accompanied by much turmoil. 
Instability is the new character of world affairs. It has roots in ethnic conflicts, failed 
states, newly emerging states, separatist movements, regional tensions, economic 
rivalries, regionalism, globalization, emerging powers and, above all, terrorism. New 
types of threats – such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, migration, environmental 
problems, structural violence, questions of identity, separatism, religious 
fundamentalism, terrorism, energy security, water security, and economic recession – 
have replaced old ones, so that there are now more uncertainties than ever (Toksöz, 
2009). 
Among the new types of threats, terrorism has added a new dimension to the 
national security strategies and objectives of all countries. For example, the events of 
September 11, 2001, affected the national security strategies of the United States 
tremendously. This is manifest not only in its military operations in different regions of 
the world, but also in the daily lives of American citizens. New security policies in the 
airline industry are good examples of this. Mr. Y (2011) explores the change in the 
national security strategy of the U.S. by pointing out five major new changes/orientations 






 From control in a closed system1 to credible influence in an open system2 
 From containment3 to sustainment 
 From deterrence and defense to civilian engagement and competition 
 From zero-sum to positive-sum global politics/economics 
 From national security to national prosperity and security (Mr. Y, 2011) 
The Republic of Turkey, as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
member and an ally of the U.S., has also altered its national security strategies according 
to the new threats and transitions in the global system. Turkey is located in a problematic 
area of the world, surrounded by the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. It has 
been affected by the spill-over effect of existing crises and instabilities within its 
neighborhood, so it categorizes any crisis or instability in the region as a threat to its own 
security. Instability in the region has provided a fertile ground for terrorism (Toksöz, 
2009). Terrorists are especially concentrated in the southeastern part of Turkey where the 
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) are fighting against terrorists determinedly and 
continuously. To support its success in the War on Terrorism, the Ministry of National 
Defense (MND) wants to acquire the latest technological Major Defense Systems (MDS) 
to strengthen the TAF and to modernize its current systems. 
Today, many countries are making large investments to strengthen their military 
capabilities in order to attain their national security objectives. Each country wants to 
improve its defense strength by acquiring new systems. This acquisition is hampered by 
today’s global economic crisis such that countries must create effective strategies and 
implement more efficiently than in the past. Turkey, as a developing country, procured its 
needed MDS up until the 1990s from other developed countries, especially from the 
United States. Using Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) or Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
methods, the Turkish MND mostly signed procurement contracts for its MDS, including 
                                                 
1 General Systems Theory by David S. Walonick, Ph.D., 1993, states: “A closed system is one where 
interactions occur only among the system components and not with the environment.” 
2 General Systems Theory by David S. Walonick, Ph.D., 1993, states: “An open system is one that 
receives input from the environment and / or releases output to the environment.” 
3 It is a United States policy using military, economic, and diplomatic strategies to stall the spread of 
communism, enhance the U.S.’s security and influence abroad. This policy is used during the Cold-War 
period by the U.S. 
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those for joint production programs, such as the F-16 program. However, since the mid-
2000s, the Turkish defense industry has begun to produce systems uniquely designed to 
meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı [SSM], 
2011). 
The level of investment in robotics systems for military and homeland security is 
increasing worldwide. According to the Economist article (2011), the U.S. has been 
investing in UAVs, and the usage of them in counter-terrorism operations has increased 
1,200% since 2005. The UAVs’ importance in the theater has been emphasized: 
Laden with sophisticated sensors and carrying Hellfire missiles and laser-
guided bombs, they patrol the skies above Afghanistan, launch lethally 
accurate strikes against terrorists in the tribal areas of Pakistan, Yemen 
and Somalia and have helped NATO turn the tide against Muammer 
Qaddafi’s forces in Libya. (The Economist, 2011) 
The success of UAVs in the War on Terrorism has provided the impetus for 
governments to invest in other types of unmanned systems (UMSs), such as unmanned 
ground or maritime systems. The Turkish MND has been investing in such robotic 
systems and the Turkish defense industry has begun to produce its own uniquely 
designed platforms. The primary application of these robotic systems, based on the needs 
of the Turkish Armed Forces, has been UAVs. The Turkish Armed Forces plans to use 
UAVs against terrorists, just as the U.S. Armed Forces has used them in Afghanistan.  
The Turkish MND keeps track of the current trends in defense industries all 
around the world and has observed the rising interest in unmanned ground vehicles 
(UGVs) and their many valuable attributes that can aid and complement warfighters on 
the battlefield. UGVs not only provide tactical commanders with increased mission 
capability, they also reduce risks to personnel, and they will most likely leverage the 
strength and capabilities of the Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism. Thus, this study 
will focus on this new trend. The first step in this analysis of UGVs is to determine the 
needed capabilities, capability gaps, and requirements of the Turkish MND. Then, this 
project will employ the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) method of the U.S. Defense 
Acquisition System to determine the best available near-term UGV for the Turkish MND. 
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B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this MBA project is to conduct an analysis of the best available 
UGV in the current market with respect to the requirements of the Turkish MND. The 
current capabilities of the Turkish MND regarding UGVs will be explored by analyzing 
the Turkish MND’s Technology Management Strategy. The requirements and capability 
gaps of the Turkish MND in regard to UGVs will be discussed within the analysis. This 
study will also provide a review of UMSs, with a specific focus on Unmanned Ground 
Systems: their types, supporting technology areas, and the current UGV market. 
Additionally, current UGV efforts in the Turkish Ministry of National Defense will be 
explored.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
This research is primarily concerned with the question:  
 What is the best available UGV in the current market with respect to the 
requirements of the Turkish MND?  
2. Secondary Research Questions 
This research is also concerned with these additional questions: 
 What capabilities does the Turkish MND have with regards to UGVs? 
 What are the capability gaps and requirements of the Turkish MND 
regarding UGVs? 
D. SCOPE 
This research focuses on UGVs and the best available UGV in the current market 
with respect to the requirements of the Turkish MND. Our decision to focus only on 
UGVs is justified as follows. First, UMSs are a broad subject to explore within a limited 
time frame. Second, there is growing attention to UGVs, even though the current trend 
for unmanned vehicles in the TAF is toward UAVs. Finally, in order to find the best 
available UGV, we needed to narrow our research area by focusing on the requirements 
of the Turkish MND for these vehicles (since the first and the most important step in 
acquiring a major defense system containing complexity, variability, and technological 
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maturity is to define the needed capabilities, capability gaps, and requirements for that 
system). The depth of our analysis was driven by the availability of information and data 
from open literature resources. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Our research starts with an overview of UGVs that explores UMS concepts, UGV 
types, supporting technology areas, and the current UGV market.  After this overview, 
we explore current UGV efforts in the Turkish MND to determine the Turkish MND’s 
current UGV capabilities. In this study, we employ the AoA model of the U.S. Defense 
Acquisition System. We apply this model to determine the capability gaps and 
requirements of the Turkish MND in terms of UGVs and to analyze the best available 
UGV in the current market with respect to the requirements of the Turkish MND. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I is an introduction to our topic: “An Analysis of the Best Available 
Unmanned Ground Vehicle in the Current Market with respect to the Requirements of the 
Turkish Ministry of National Defense.” It provides an overview of the purpose, research 
questions, scope, applied methodology, and organization of the project. 
Chapter II provides an overview of UGVs. It begins with general UMS concepts 
and then explores UGVs by focusing on the types, supporting technology areas, and the 
current world market for UGVs. The goal of this overview is to provide readers with a 
background on UGVs and to conduct UGV market research. 
Chapter III introduces the history of the Turkish defense industry and the Under 
Secretariat for Defense Industries. It then reviews the technology management strategy of 
the Turkish MND and current UGV efforts in the Turkish MND and the Turkish defense 
industry. The goal of this chapter is to understand the capabilities of the Turkish MND 
and defense industry regarding UGVs. 
Chapter IV establishes an evaluation methodology to analyze the data collected 
from the open literature in Chapter V. The employed model is the AoA method of the 
U.S. Defense Acquisition System. First, we define the concept of operations, needed 
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capabilities, capability gaps, threats, scenario, key performance parameters (KPPs), and 
mission tasks (MTs) / measures of effectiveness (MoEs) / measures of performance 
(MoPs). Then, we establish the methodology for our analyses – which are effectiveness 
analysis and risk analysis – and we explain the alternative comparison matrix. The goal 
of this chapter is to provide an overview of the AoA model employed in Chapter V. 
In Chapter V, we employ the AoA framework to define the capability gaps and 
the requirements of the Turkish MND in terms of UGVs. Then, we perform an 
effectiveness analysis and a risk analysis, and we generate an alternative comparison 
matrix to decide the best available UGV with respect to the requirements of the Turkish 
MND.  
The final chapter contains the conclusion of this study and describes how this 
study points to new perspectives and opportunities for further research. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF UGVS 
This chapter will focus on unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). We will first 
explore the concept of unmanned vehicles and provide information about UGVs. Then, 
we will explore supporting technology areas. Finally, we will examine the current UGV 
market and describe several examples of the UGVs from select countries. 
A. THE CONCEPT OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
At the end of the Cold War, most countries reduced the size of their military 
forces in spite of an increase in the number of conflicts and peacekeeping operations in 
the world. Therefore, countries have started to look for faster, cheaper, and more efficient 
systems to replace human beings and keep their personnel out of harm’s way as much as 
possible. Technologically developed countries have started to use robotic systems in their 
military forces to perform many tasks, such as the suppression of enemy forces and mine 
detection and clearance (Wilson, 1997). 
The greatest benefit of robotic systems is that they decrease danger to military 
personnel. They can increase the speed of military tempos without common human 
weaknesses like tiredness, fear, and stress. Therefore, the introduction of unmanned 
vehicles can create new and innovative operational concepts and reduce the chance of 
friendly fire (IHS Jane's, 1997). 
UMSs have the ability to perform tasks that manned vehicles cannot, and they can 
provide force multiplication for the success of missions in a way that is affordable for a 
nation (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2007). They can perform routine, repetitive, or 
physically challenging tasks and provide necessary distance while operating on dirty or 
risky missions.  They have saved the lives of many military personnel in different places 





The Department of Defense’s (DoD) “Unmanned Systems Safety Guide for DoD 
Acquisition” (2007) defines UMSs as: 
An electro-mechanical system that is able to exert its power to perform 
designed missions and includes the following: (1) there is no human 
operator aboard, (2) manned systems that can be fully or partially operated 
in an autonomous mode, and (3) the system is designed to return or be 
recoverable. The system may be mobile or stationary, and includes the 
vehicle/device and the control station. Missiles, rockets and their 
submunitions, and artillery are not considered UMSs. UMSs include, but 
are not limited to: unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), unmanned 
aerial/aircraft systems (UAVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), 
unmanned surface vessels (USVs), unattended munitions, and unattended 
ground sensors (UGSs). (p. 1) 
B. WHAT ARE UGVs?  
Ivlev and Weiss (2011) define UGVs as: 
In the broadest "dictionary" sense, an unmanned ground vehicle is any 
piece of mechanized equipment that moves across the surface of the 
ground and serves as a means of carrying or transporting something, but 
explicitly does NOT carry a human being. In other words, it must be 
controlled remotely, or its actions must be pre-determined. A UGV must 
have some sort of on-board artificial intelligence, allowing it to make 
decisions, and must adapt to situations quicker than any human can 
imagine. (p. 1) 
According to the DoD (2006), a variety of prototypes, both commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) purchases and fielded systems of UGVs, can serve in broad mission areas 
such as improvised explosive device (IED) detection and defeat, scouting, explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD), force protection (FP), countermining, unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) clearance, among others. They come in a myriad of sizes, from a hand-launched 
Throwbot prototype that weighs less than a pound to large systems like the Abrams 
Panther mine-clearing vehicle that weighs over forty tons (DoD, 2006). 
The DoD’s “Unmanned Ground Vehicle Master Plan” (1991) lists the following 
potential payoffs of UGVs: 
 Reduced risk to human life and increased operational flexibility in 
combat or other hazardous environments 
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 Economy of manpower or reduced costs in operations done 
repetitively (e.g., logistics) where manpower savings more than 
offset investments in equipment 
 Reduced training costs and increased training realism 
 Improved performance where automated systems either perform 
better than humans or eliminate the system compromises required 
by human physiological limits (creature comfort, fear, fatigue, 
vibration, etc.)  
 Force multiplication where operators with UGVs bring 
substantially more capability to bear than would be possible by 
individual troops without UGVs (p. 2) 
In summary, the National Research Council (NRC, 2002) has said UGVs can help 
and complement forces in military operations, decreasing casualties and increasing the 
combat effectiveness of soldiers. 
The different categories of UGVs provide a wide range of mission capabilities 
with various degrees of autonomy regarding command and tasking functions, terrain 
reasoning, military maneuvering, and mobility design (NRC, 2002). An NRC report 
(2002) describes four generic classifications of UGV capabilities that are based upon 
relevance to potential missions, level of autonomy, and the challenge that must be 
implemented.  Table 1 lists the UGV capability classes with potential mission function 
applications. 
Capability Class Other Possible Applications 
Tele-operated ground 
vehicle 
Mine detection, mine clearing, engineer construction, EOD/UXO, materials 
handling, soldier-portable reconnaissance/surveillance 
Semiautonomous 
preceder/follower 
Supply convoy, medical evacuation, smoke laying, indirect fire, 




Remote sensor, counter-sniper, counter-reconnaissance/ infiltration, indirect fire, 
single outpost/scout, chemical/biological agent detection, battle fire, single 




Deep RSTA, combined arms (lethal direct fire/reconnaissance/ indirect fire for 
small unit defense or offense), static area defense, MOUT reconnaissance 
RSTA = reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; MOUT = military operations in urban terrain. 
Table 1.   UGV Capability Classes and Potential Mission Function Applications (From 
NRC, 2002) 
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Munk (2003) gives examples of different types of UGVs that perform different 
tasks in military operations. These examples include: 
 Soldier UGVs carried by one or more soldiers to perform a variety 
of tasks (reconnaissance, surveillance, door breach, smoke 
generation, etc.) in support of dismounted soldiers.  
 Transport (mule) UGVs that are towed to the operational area by a 
larger vehicle to perform transportation missions (dismounted 
troop material services or supplies movement). Armed 
reconnaissance vehicle UGVs that perform armed RSTA missions 
and are capable of man in-the-loop weapon fire via a C4ISR 
network.  
 Unmanned ground combat vehicles (UGCVs) that include robotic 
direct fire and robotic non-line-of-sight fire weapon systems. (p. 
200) 
1. UGV Types 
U.S. Army Developmental Test Command (2009) identifies three categories of 
UGVs based upon size, mode of operation, and weapon type.  
a. Size  
Micro UGV: An unmanned ground vehicle weighing less than 10 lbs.  
SUGV (Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle): An unmanned ground 
vehicle weighing less than 200 lbs.  
MUGV (Medium Unmanned Ground Vehicle): An unmanned ground 
vehicle weighing between 200 and 2,000 lbs.  
LUGV (Large Unmanned Ground Vehicle): An unmanned ground 
vehicle weighing more than 2,000 lbs. 
b. Mode of Operation  
Tethered: A mode of control wherein the human operator controls the 
UGV through a direct, wired connection. An example of such connection would be a 
fiber-optic cable. Typically a line of sight (LOS) must be maintained under tethered 
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operation; however, under certain circumstances, a LOS isn’t necessary (i.e., operation in 
a tunnel, around corners).  
Remote Controlled: A mode of control wherein the human operator must 
dedicate 100 percent of his/her attention to system operation without benefit of sensory 
feedback from the vehicle. A LOS must be maintained with the vehicle under remote 
control operation.  
Tele-operated: A mode of control wherein the human operator has 
control of the UGV through cues provided by video, audio and digital feedback. The 
human operator controls the UGV through a wireless connection transmitted over radio 
frequencies (RF). The human operator must dedicate 100 percent of his/her time to 
operating the UGV. A LOS does not necessarily need to be maintained under 
teleoperation. 
Autonomous: A mode of control wherein the UGV is self-sufficient. The 
human operator can program a mission for the UGV, but the UGV will execute the 
mission without any human interaction. There are varying levels of autonomy in regards 
to the level of human interaction with the UGV.  
Semi-autonomous: A UGV that has multiple modes of control occurring 
simultaneously to include at least one autonomously controlled function. The level of 
semi-autonomy can vary greatly from UGV to UGV and will tend to be used extensively 
on weaponized UGVs (i.e., a weaponized UGV equipped with an Autonomous 
Navigation and Obstacle Avoidance System, but with tele-operated, operator-controlled 
weapon functions).  
Manned: A mode of control wherein the UGV is directly controlled by a 
human operator through the use of a steering wheel.  
c. Weapon Type  
Weaponized, projectile: A UGV equipped with any device that launches 
a projectile (i.e., machine gun, smoke grenades, and lane markers).  
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Weaponized, non-projectile: A UGV equipped with any energetic device 
that can affect the area around the vehicle without launching a projectile (i.e., acoustic, 
laser, sonic devices). 
Weaponized, non-lethal projectile: A UGV equipped with a weapon or 
device that launches a non-lethal projectile (i.e., rubber bullets, pepper balls, netting, 
paint balls). 
Non-weaponized: A UGV not equipped with a weapon or device that 
affects the environment around the vehicle. (pp. 3–4) 
D. SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY AREAS 
The DoD’s “FY2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap” (2009) 
outlines the key capabilities of unmanned vehicles. Whereas UAVs need to fly in and 
around urban environments, and UUVs and USVs must be able to work in and around 
ports and marinas, UGVs must be able to operate within buildings, tunnels, and streets 
(where they have to deal with traffic, pedestrians, and even curbs, drains, and trash). 
Within buildings, they must be able to traverse stairs and elevators, open doors, and 
access desks, file drawers, and cupboards – places where there is no Global Positioning 
System (GPS) signal. UGVs must have the ability to navigate in changing terrain and 
under various payload, range, and endurance requirements. In addition, they must be able 
to perform complex manipulation of objects in order to imitate humans performing 
complex tasks. Therefore, there are many key capabilities unique to UGVs. Of key 
importance is the ability to behave autonomously (DoD, 2009).  
Sellers, Ramsbotham, Bertrand, and Karvonides (2008) argue that state-of-the-art 
technology is not capable of a fully autonomous, on-board sensor, perception-based 
operation (navigation and control without the use of preprogrammed map information, a 
GPS, or other cooperative navigation aids). However, countries are looking for ways to 
improve these areas of technology. The United States, France, Germany, and Japan are 
currently giving great attention to these improvements, while Canada, Israel, and the 
United Kingdom (UK) have the capability to advance in these technology areas. Other  
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countries that have the potential to contribute improvements are Australia, South Korea, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, China, Russia, Singapore, and Finland (Sellers, Ramsbotham, 
Bertrand, & Karvonides, 2008). 
Table 2 lists the key capabilities and consolidates the projected evolution of them 
for UGVs. Most importantly, the level of autonomy allows for a high level of human 
control/intervention today. However, it should progress to a level where there is high 
level of human oversight (DoD, 2009). 
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 2009        Evolutionary Adaptation        2015           Revolutionary Adaptation                2034 
Maneuverability Simple Task/Man 
Dependent SA/Off Board 
SA 
Limited Adaptation, Real 
Time, and Planning Sense 
and Avoid 
Fully Real-Time Planning, 
Team of Team Coll., Fully 
Auto/On Board SA 
Speed 20 Mph 45 Mph 90 Mph 
Survivability Basic Teleoperations  Fully Auto with Real Time, 
Urban Combat, On-Off Road 
Operations, Hostile 
Environment  




Fully Auto, Approaching Zero 
Human Interaction 




















 All Weather Environmental 
Difficulty 
Product Line Mission Package Product 
Line Dependent 
 Product Line Independent 
OPSEC Signature High  Signature Low 
Operational 
Control 
1 Operator / Platform 1 Operator / Domain 1 Operator / Team 





Hours Days / Months Years 
Maintenance Operator  Automated 
Awareness Sensor Data Situational Awareness Actionable Information 
Table 2.   Key Capabilities for UGVs (From DoD, 2009) 
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According to an NRC report (2002), every UGV should have a mobility platform, 
along with sensors, computers, software (including modules for perception, navigation, 
learning/adaptation, behaviors and skills, human–robot interaction, and health 
maintenance), communications, and power sources. It may also have a separate mission 
package that can be adjusted based on the role of the UGV in the mission. The same 
report describes supporting technology areas required by UGVs illustrated in Figure 1 
(NRC, 2002). 
 
Figure 1.   UGV Supporting Technology Areas (From NRC, 2002) 
1. Autonomous Behavior 
Ireland (2010) discusses the definition of autonomy: 
In general terms, autonomy is defined as “the quality or state of being self-
governing”. Within the realm of unmanned systems, however, a more 
specific definition is necessary. At the 2003 Performance Metrics for 
Intelligent Systems Workshop, Huang, Messina, and Albus defined 
unmanned systems autonomy as “its own capability to achieve its mission 
goals. They further stated that the more complex the mission goals are, the 
higher the level of autonomy required, and that levels of autonomy are 
proportional to the system’s capability to perceive, plan, decide, and then 
act. (p. 8) 
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According to Jun (2007), autonomy relates to systems that have the ability to 
operate in an actual environment for a long time without external support. At the present 
time, fully autonomous systems have not yet been developed (Jun, 2007). 
State-of-the-art military ground robots are remotely operated or tele-operated 
systems (even though prototypes with a certain degree of autonomy have been 
demonstrated). Autonomous systems are dependent upon preprogrammed motion or the 
ability to respond to simple sensor input. These systems do not have (or have only 
limited) capabilities to interpret on-board sensor data (Holste, Ciccimaro, & 
Dudenhoeffer, 2009). 
In Ho’s study (2006), “FY2005 Joint Robotics Program (JRP) Master Plan” lays 
out an evolution roadmap (as depicted in Figure 2), which shows that robot autonomy 
will be achieved on the battlefield by 2020. 
 
Figure 2.   Robot Autonomy by 2020 (From Ho, 2006) 
According to an NRC report (2005), defining the level of autonomy (LOA) is 
necessary to classify systems for comparison purposes. There is no consensus on a single 
LOA scale across the wide range of users.  
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The same report shows an LOA scale created by the U.S. Army for the Future Combat 
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Table 3.   Levels of Autonomy in the U.S. Army Scale for the Future Combat System  
(From NRC, 2005) 
The components of the entire system need computer processing power, which is a 
function of speed and memory and consists of related software and algorithms. There is a 
direct connection between computing power and advances in autonomous capability. The 





Figure 3.   Relationship of Processor Speed and Memory (From Ireland, 2010) 
Raymond Kurzweil argues in his book The Singularity Is Near: When Humans 
Transcend Biology that a computer will pass the Turing test by 2029 and will be able to 
“think” like a human. He also argues that several military UAVs and UGVs will be 100% 
computer-controlled by 2025 (“The Singularity Is Near,” n. d.). 
According to Arkin (2009), teams of autonomous systems and human soldiers 
will cooperate on the battlefield, as opposed to armies of unmanned systems functioning 
by themselves. The age of full autonomy for armed robots will come in the future once 
they are able to hunt, authenticate, and kill a target without any human intervention 
(Arkin, 2009). 
a. Perception 
European Robotics Technology Platform (EUROP, 2009) defines 
perception as “the robot’s ability to build and interpret representations of the physical 
world from sensed data” (p. 33). 
The perception system develops a world map, using data from sensors to 
build a representation of the world around the UGV. A set of software modules in the 
perception system transforms lower-level, image-processing functions to higher-level 
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reasoning by using geometry, color, or other properties of the objects to classify the 
objects in the scene. To verify or refine the UGV’s internal estimate of its location 
(recognize landmarks), a perception system must be able to detect, classify, and locate a 
number of natural and artificial features (NRC, 2002). 
Specific perception system objectives include a road following, following 
a planned path cross-country, and obstacle avoidance. These are obtained from the 
required vehicle speed and characteristics of the assumed operating environment (e.g., 
obstacle density, visibility, illumination [day/night], weather [which affects visibility and 
illumination but may also change feature appearance]) (NRC, 2002). 




Find and follow the road  Follow a planned path subject to tactical constraints. 
Detect and avoid 
obstacles 
Find mobility corridors that enable the planned path or that support re-
planning. 
Detect and track other 
vehicles  
Detect and avoid obstacles. 
Detect and identify 
landmarks 
Identify features that provide cover, concealment, vantage points or as required 
by tactical behaviors. Detect and identify landmarks. Detect, identify, and track 
other vehicles in formation. Detect, identify, and track dismounted infantry in 
force. 
Table 4.   Perception System Tasks (From NRC, 2002) 
UGVs have the challenge of operating in any weather (rain, fog, snow) 
and changing terrain caused by the weather. They must operate during day or night and 
contend with dust, wind, or other battlefield obscurants (DoD, 2009; NRC, 2002). They 
must be able to make decisions in situations, such as when the ground becomes slippery 
as a result of rain or when the roads are covered with snow (DoD, 2009). 
EUROP (2009) makes predictions about the future development of 




Short-term (2010) Sensor fusion is task-specific and relies on calibration; limited by processing 
power; use of attention mechanisms 
Mid-term (2015) Advanced task-dependent sensor fusion; multiple sensor modalities; step 
change in visual servoing; known events interpreted 
Long-term (2020+) Sensing on chip; perception techniques take over from fusion (closer to human 
perception system); no longer task-dependent 
Table 5.   Perception Technology Developments (From EUROP, 2009) 
b. Navigation 
EUROP (2009) explains that “Navigation is concerned with controlling 
movement. It relies on mapping, localization, and collision avoidance” (p. 31). 
Navigation is a big problem for UGVs. An NRC report (2002) defines the 
elements related to navigation: 
 Current location (both absolute and relative); 
 Directions to desired location(s), such as final destination or 
intermediate waypoints; 
 Aid in situational awareness (SA), including providing the location 
of friendly forces and targets over a large region; 
 Map of immediate surroundings, how to navigate about the 
immediate surroundings and how to navigate to the next waypoint 
or final destination; 
 The detection of nearby hazards to mobility. (p. 51) 
The navigation module uses algorithms, such as Simultaneous 
Localization and Mapping (SLAM), to learn a “map” of its environment and uses that 
map as a basis for planning navigation. Studies of SLAM, also called Cooperative 
Mapping and Localization (CML), influenced the development of robots deployed in real 
applications (Bekey, et al., 2008).  
The UGV’s current position and poses (roll, pitch, and yaw) in absolute 
coordinates are monitored by the navigation system that supports the conversion of 
sensor data into an absolute frame of reference. For this operation, the system uses a  
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number of independent means, such as an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), GPS, and 
odometry – with estimates from these sources combined by a Kalman filter, or something 
of the kind (NRC, 2002). 
Navigation has connection with certain key technology areas, such as 
perception, path planning, behaviors, human–machine interface, and communications. 
One of the primary goals of the navigation system is to help give enough information to 
enable near- autonomous mobility for the UGV (NRC, 2002). 
EUROP (2009) indicates the future developments of the navigation 
technologies, as given in Table 6. 
 
Timeframe Developments 
Short-term (2010) Navigation expensive (computation & sensors); localization and mapping in 
controlled environments solved 
Mid-term (2015) Some perception based localization; SLAM for challenging environments; 
collision avoidance considers dynamic objects 
Long-term (2020+) SLAM in unconstrained environments; collision avoidance with dynamic, non-
cooperative obstacles through perception 
Table 6.   Navigation Technology Developments (From EUROP, 2009) 
Sensors are necessary for the navigation of the UGV, which must be able 
to sense its environment, use the relative locations of events and landmarks, and answer 
questions such as: Where am I? Do I have a map of this area? How do I move in order to 
accomplish my task? There are new sensor technologies, like Light Detection and 
Ranging (LIDAR), which allow robots to detect obstacles and landmarks, and then 
combine input about them with its navigation strategies to generate depth maps of solid 
objects (Bekey, et al., 2008). 
To date, sensor developments are not focused on the needs of ground 
robots. Sensors developed for military applications are mostly for long-range target 
detection and are large (e.g., 8 in. optics), heavy, and have a very narrow field of view. 
Video and infrared (IR) imagers, stereo video systems, scanning laser rangefinders, 
millimeter radars, and ultrasound sensors are typical examples of mobile robot sensors 
(NRC, 2005). 
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EUROP (2009) shows the future developments of the sensor technologies, 
as illustrated in Table 7.  
 
Timeframe Developments 
Short-term (2010) Gradual replacement of special hardware (frame grabbers, 
cameras…); 3D vision sensors in low resolution 
Mid-term (2015) Higher frame rate of visual sensors; greatly improved 3D vision 
sensors; no moving parts in laser scanners 
Long-term (2020+) Visual processes on sensor or dedicated processors; multimodal sensing for 
intrinsic safety 
Table 7.   Sensor Technology Developments (From EUROP, 2009) 
c. Planning 
EUROP (2009) describes planning as “the computation and selection of 
paths, motions, actions, tasks, policies, procedures, and missions for goal-directed robot 
behavior” (p. 31). 
Planning is a serious challenge in robotics. The current level of planning 
and control algorithms only enables the robots to perform in narrowly prescribed 
scenarios, using very complicated programming which is written by humans with great 
effort. Even perfect sensing and hardware might not allow robots to reach human 
performance in most situations (Computing Community Consortium [CCC], 2009). 
Planning includes software for both path planning, which has a 
relationship with perception and navigation, and mission planning for UGVs (NRC, 
2002). 
The NRC report (2002) describes path planning as “the process of 
generating a motion trajectory from a specified starting position to a goal position while 
avoiding obstacles in the environment” (p. 55). 
The NRC report (2002) also describes motion planning as: 
From a military perspective, autonomous mission planning goes well 
beyond path planning. It is the ability of the autonomous UGV to 
determine its best course of military action, considering synergistically the 
mission being supported by the UGV; enemy situation and capabilities; 
terrain, features, obstacles, and weather conditions; the UGV’s own and 
 24
friendly force situation and vulnerabilities; noncombatant information; 
time available; knowledge of military operations and procedures; and 
unique needs of the integrated mission package. (p. 57) 
EUROP (2009) identifies future developments of the planning 
technologies, as given in Table 8. 
 
Timeframe Developments 
Short-term (2010) Manual programming superior to automated planning (optimized process path 
based on human experience); randomized motions as planning alternative 
Mid-term (2015) Automated mission and process planning using, for example, databases of 
expert knowledge 
Long-term (2020+) Autonomous, online planning for tasks of high dimensionality; learn from 
human (often interactively) 
Table 8.   Planning Technology Developments (From EUROP, 2009) 
d. Behaviors and Skills 
According to the NRC report (2002): 
A behavior is coupling of sensing and acting into a prototype, observable 
pattern of action. It can be innate, learned, or strictly a stimulus response 
(e.g., ducking when something is thrown at you). A skill is a collection of 
behaviors needed to follow a plan or accomplish a complex task (e.g., 
riding a bicycle). (p. 58) 
Reflexive obstacle avoidance, road following, formation keeping, and 
steering to avoid tipping over on steep-sided slopes are common robot behaviors. How to 
develop these individual behaviors while integrating the multiple types of behaviors into 
a consistent system is still not entirely understood. However, this needs to be achieved 
(NRC, 2005). 
UGV can move and perform work with the aid of software for Behavior 
and Skills. Taking the input from Perception, Navigation, and Planning, this software 
then integrates and transforms it into motor commands for the UGV. This software also 
enables the UGV to perform mission-specific functions that are dependent upon tactics, 
techniques, and procedures used in military operations (NRC, 2002). 
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Tactical behaviors related to military skills are necessary for the UGV to 
operate on the battlefield. Cooperative behaviors are another area that will allow UGVs to 
perform tasks with other unmanned systems, such as UAVs (NRC, 2002). 
e. Learning/Adaptation 
“Learning refers to adaptation of robot behavior through practice, 
experience or teaching” (EUROP, 2009, p. 32). The Learning/Adaptation technology area 
includes neural networks, fuzzy logic, and genetic algorithms, which are related to 
artificial intelligence. It also includes adaptive controls, which are related to control 
theory (NRC, 2002). 
Learning/Adaptation software utilizes experience to improve system 
performance of a system, so the system improves over time and a more robust system can 
be achieved (i.e., the system can handle variability not initially anticipated by the 
system’s programmers) (NRC, 2002). 
EUROP (2009) indicates the future developments of the learning 
technologies, as illustrated in Table 9. 
 
Timeframe Developments 
Short-term (2010) Parts of robot systems use learning methods; well-defined conditions; learning 
from expert teacher 
Mid-term (2015) Essential parts of controllers use learning methods; learning by experience; 
learning by demonstration 
Long-term (2020+) Complete robotic systems use learning methods (learning by observation, 
flexible conditions) 
Table 9.   Learning Technology Developments (From EUROP, 2009) 
2. Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) 
HRI covers the macrocosm of how intelligent agents work together in a 
system. It encompasses human–robot interfaces, which are specialized 
human–computer interfaces for the particular needs of HRI in a defined 
system but is much broader. HRI is not synonymous with human-centered 
computing, whereby computers augment human ability, but it is assumed 
that the principles of human-centered computing or design will be applied 
to HRI systems when appropriate. (NRC, 2002, p. 72) 
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The HRI area has been drawing the attention of a growing number of networking 
initiatives and dedicated events worldwide (Dillmann & Asfour, 2009). It explores how 
humans and robots can communicate with each other via interfaces, using a number of 
channels (EUROP, 2009). Multimodal interface technologies are the key aspect for HRI. 
They enable robots to “observe” humans and their environments by recruiting signals 
from multiple audio-visual sensors. Natural multimodal interaction is the basic issue in 
the HRI area and is dependent upon visual person localization and tracking and upon 
gesture and posture recognition, speech recognition, and dialogue processing (Dillmann 
& Asfour, 2009). 
HRI covers the interaction of humans with multiple robots (particularly in times 
of stress and cognitive fatigue), the dynamic sharing of responsibilities between humans 
and robots (an accomplishment dependent upon the context), and reducing the impact of 
uncertainty and information overload. HRI is useful for decreasing training times and 
providing a common interaction mode for controlling UGVs and UAVs (NRC, 2002). 
EUROP (2009) points out the future development of HRI technologies, as 
illustrated in Table 10. 
 
Timeframe Developments 
Short-term (2010) Mostly graphical or text-based interfaces; few haptic devices and use of human 
interaction channels; touch interfaces 
Mid-term (2015) Human interaction channels, which human has to learn; some tele-presence; 
haptic input devices; learning interfaces 
Long-term (2020+) Interaction using human channels utilizing cognitive approaches; neural 
interfaces; non-invasive brain interfaces 
Table 10.   HRI Technology Developments (From EUROP, 2009) 
3. Mobility 
The NRC report (2002) describes mobility as: 
The ability of the robotic vehicle to traverse a rough terrain without any 
perception. The mobility of a UGV is often expressed in terms of the size 
of an obstacle (both negative and positive) it can negotiate and still 
continue along a specified path. As pointed out in U.S. Army (1998), for 
several reasons a UGV must have a high degree of mobility: 
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 A high degree of mobility minimizes the perception burden. 
 Timely mission accomplishment cannot be achieved if the platform 
has to spend its time searching for an easy path through difficult 
terrain. 
 The best route for covert missions will mostly likely not coincide 
with the easiest mobility route. 
 A high degree of mobility will keep the vehicle from becoming 
stuck, thus requiring human assistance. (p. 76) 
UGVs can be grouped as wheeled, tracked, or hybrid (a combination of wheeled 
and tracked). Wheeled UGVs are simpler, quieter, and more reliable. Tracked UGVs are 
noisier, and the tracks can be broken easily, but they have better traction and floatation 
ability than wheeled vehicles on slippery surfaces (NRC, 2002). 
A number of criteria are used to evaluate the mobility of a UGV. The criteria for 
discrete obstacle negotiation are the ability to achieve tree and stump knock-over, gap 
crossing, fording water, vertical step crossing, and tree and stump avoidance. The criteria 
for all-terrain mobility are horsepower per ton, axial twist, ground pressure, vehicle cone 
index (VCI), forward/reverse slope, side slope operation, side slope stability margin, 
width for rollover resistance, side-step clearance height, high-low speed range, and 
ground clearance (NRC, 2002). 
UGV mobility technologies need to be improved for off-road terrain with the 
following additions: smart active-suspension systems, new tire materials with controlled 
inflation, and high-performance traction with slip control for each wheel. UGVs do not 
have the limitations of a human crew, but their mobility platforms must be integrated 
with perception technologies to avoid obstacles to compensate for replacing human crew 
with mechanisms (NRC, 2002).    
The U.S. Army Logistics Innovation Agency report (2006) identifies the future 




Short-term (<2011) Human assistance technology, such as the exoskeleton, will be available to 
carry heavy loads. Specialized robot platforms are being developed that will 
incorporate more than one mobility technology, such as tracks and wheels. 
Snake type robots will be used for traveling into openings and areas that are 
too small for normal robots or soldiers. 
Mid-term (<2016) Balancing, traction, and selective braking technologies as part of an active 
suspension will allow robotic systems to negotiate or climb over obstacles. 
Artificial muscles will be refined and come into common use. Legged systems 
will become ubiquitous with efficiencies that rival or exceed those of wheeled 
vehicles. 
Long-term (<2026) Electrostatic repulsion vehicles may be available for robotic systems. Robotic 
systems may have the ability to morph-into different types of mobility 
technology depending on the terrain and surroundings encountered. 
Table 11.   Mobility Technology Developments (From U.S. Army Logistics Innovation 
Agency, 2006) 
4. Communication 
According to EUROP (2009), the role of communication is “concerned with 
hardware and software communication within the system’s time constraints in the context 
of its architecture” (p. 29). 
Various high-priority applications require communication and networking 
technologies, both of which are essential for the remote distribution of robotic systems, 
accessing remote data or computing resources, and interacting with humans (CCC, 2009). 
Tethered (Ethernet, fiber optic, etc.) and wireless/RF are current technologies in the 
communication field (U.S. Army Logistics Innovation Agency, 2006). 
Present military data links provide the ability to convey a particular set of 
information from one platform to another for UGV communications. It is a logistically 
complicated task to preplan and organize these communication channels. Planning these 
communication channels manually before the mission or controlling communication 
manually during the mission are two crucial steps that need to be accomplished (NRC, 
2002). 
Communication for mobility management is getting more important for network-




it is necessary. Communication differences between manned and unmanned systems 
require common vision and technical architecture, as well as compliance with common 
interface standards (NRC, 2002). 
The communication bandwidth enables coordination between vehicles and has an 
essential role in planning the paths of multiple UGVs. If there is less bandwidth, there 
will be less coordination between systems (NRC, 2002). 
Improved frequency bandwidth enables multiple UGVs (and other unmanned 
systems) to operate as a group – simultaneously and closely with one another. Since the 
frequency spectrum is limited physically, there are limited available frequencies for 
UGVs. In the future, available frequencies for multiple unmanned systems will be a 
problem because they will all need to operate simultaneously in a network (Moreau, 
2005). 
EUROP (2009) and a U.S. Army Logistics Innovation Agency report (2006) 




Short-term (2010) Numerous specialized protocols; Ethernet-based communication starts to take 
over as de-facto standard. 
Mid-term (2015) New protocols using ontologies, logic, probabilistic or geometric models, rule 
sets, etc. 
Infrared quantum cascade (QC) lasers will become robust enough for wide use. 
Optical technology and managed frequency distribution will also emerge along 
with motes or Smart Dust for distributed sensing and ad hoc networking. 
Antenna technology will be improved by developments in Micro-Electrical 
Mechanical Systems (MEMS).  
Long-term (2020+) Components can figure out each other’s protocols; components negotiate 
required quality of service. 
Advances may be seen in wireless communications through earth/objects or 
over the surface (direct beam, non-satellite applications)  
Table 12.   Communication Technology Developments (From EUROP, 2009; U.S. Army 
Logistics Innovation Agency, 2006) 
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5. Power / Energy 
Energy storage and power delivery play a critical role in mobile and autonomous 
robots, specifying available payload, mission duration, and service interval (CCC, 2009). 
Energy sources and their utilization rate are vital to robotic vehicles and today 
have various options that are dependent upon application. Small units can use a battery 
that is either rechargeable or non-rechargeable. Larger units can use motor-generator or 
hybrid-electric systems whose energy train needs to be fueled. The power train of robotic 
vehicles must fulfill the energy demands of mobility, housekeeping, and mission package 
(NRC, 2002). 
There are two distinct but integrated parts of UGVs: the mobility package and the 
mission package. The mobility package is the basic platform providing navigation, 
sensing, and so forth. The mission package provides the capability to function in a 
mission, with items such as weapons, logistics carriers, or reconnaissance/scout hardware 
and software. The energy requirements for mission package will differ and range from a 
few watts for long periods of time to kilowatts for short periods of time (NRC, 2002). 
Power delivery is crucial for fuel-based systems such as engines and fuel cells. 
Fuel cells could advance in power density, whereas they might not beat engines, which 
are optimized to a great extent and have clear efficiency trade-offs (CCC, 2009). 
The NRC report (2002) discusses the issues with energy as follows: 
The most obvious factors impacting the energy supply are mission 
environment, mission time, vehicle mass, signature, cost, logistics support, 
size, and efficiency. These factors are not independent and they may be 
more severe and mission limiting for small robotic vehicles with the 
energy supplies that make up most of the mass and volume of the system. 
(p. 83) 
For high-energy missions, the following issues must be addressed: 
catalysts for reforming fuel, thermal rejection processes, stealth, and 
energy storage and replenishment. (p. 9) 
NRC reports (1997, 2004) provide an overview of all power source alternatives 
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Table 13.   Overview of All Power Source Alternatives (From NRC, 1997, 2004) 
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The U.S. Army Logistics Innovation Agency report (2006) describes possible 
future developments in power technologies. These are shown in Table 14. 
 
Timeframe Developments 
Short-term  Fossil fuels and batteries will continue to be the primary power source. 
Incremental improvements to battery technology with 3:1 energy density 
advancements are expected using Zinc-air primary cells.  
Mid-term (<2016) 12:1 energy density improvements are expected using Lithium-oxygen primary 
cell batteries. However, major power breakthroughs that could affect large-
scale materiel movement are not likely to occur within the next 20 years.  
Long-term (<2026) Bio-scavenging, the conversion of plant or animal material into energy using 
fuel cells fed by bacterial metabolism will be an application to power robotic 
systems in the right settings. Power beaming could also become a viable 
technology, whether it is from satellites, lasers or other Radio Frequency (RF) 
technologies in the air or on the ground.  
Table 14.   Power Technology Developments (From U.S. Army Logistics Innovation 
Agency, 2006) 
6. Health Maintenance 
The NRC report (2002) says that... 
Health maintenance has two distinct flavors. One is making the robot more 
physically robust; the other is detecting, diagnosing, and recovering from 
component failures (or from degradations in performance that may lead to 
mission failures).  
Such failures as engine overheating, loss of communications, or flat tires 
have solutions that are not unique to unmanned systems. UGV health 
maintenance technologies resolve aspects of failures that are either unique 
to UGVs or require machine awareness. This specifically includes 
technologies targeted at preventing or mitigating failures of sensors or 
electronics for robot vehicles. (p. 88) 
Vehicle health monitoring and maintenance ensures that robots function reliably 
and within acceptable parameters. Monitoring and maintenance also forecast its set of 
tasks for the future (e.g., a robot just a few hours away from needing an overhaul should 
not be tasked for a new mission). Mission failure might be inevitable in the event of 
subtle sensor failures leading to false positives or false negatives on targets, especially 
when operators do not suspect any fault (NRC, 2002). 
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Monitoring systems for UGVs should also assist maintenance technicians and 
increase the availability of the vehicle. Fault tolerance has characteristics similar to health 
monitoring and maintenance (NRC, 2002). 
E. UGV MARKET 
Countries have started to invest in UGVs and increase utilization of them. Figure 
4 shows the distribution of UGVs throughout the world by country (Holste et al., 2009). 
 
 
Figure 4.   International Distribution of UGVs Reviewed in Market Study (From Holste et 
al., 2009) 
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According to Sellers et al. (2008), the countries with the most active military 
robotic programs are the United States, Canada, France, Germany, and Israel. Australia, 
Belgium, China, Croatia, Finland, Italy, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Singapore, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have also made various degrees of effort.  
Sellers et al. (2008) also argue that Japan is the technological leader in UGVs 
though it has not been working on miltary systems since investments in that area are 
unlucrative. The United States is the main country pursuing cutting-edge technology in 
military systems (Sellers et al., 2008). 
1. United States 
a. All-Purpose Remote Transport System (ARTS) 
 
Figure 5.   ARTS Fitted with Forklift Attachment (From IHS Jane’s, 2010) 
According to IHS Jane’s (2010), the ARTS, developed by Wesco 
Manufacturing, is a large-tracked mine-clearing and EOD UGV used in service with U.S. 
forces. The ARTS, with its low-cost and survivability, can perform remote operations in 
several mission profiles (DoD, 2009). A set of tools and attachments (such as backhoe, 
bucket, and brush cutter) can be used to detect, assess, and render safe large IEDs, tackle 
large-vehicle bombs, and clear UXO from prepared areas (DoD, 2009; IHS Jane’s, 2010). 
Both the front and rear of the ARTS can employ the loader arms. With its four-cylinder 
diesel engine, it can reach a speed of 11.2 km/h when it clears areas and clear 48 m²/h of 
light vegetation (IHS Jane’s, 2010). It has advanced navigation, control, and sensing 
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systems and can be transported by helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft. Other specifications 
are given in Table 15 (DoD, 2009; IHS Jane’s, 2010). 
 
Height: 1.98 m (without antenna)   Payload Capacity: 3500 lbs. 
Width: 1.67 m (without attachment) Endurance: 4 to 7 h 
Length: 2.89 m (without attachment) 
Remote Control 
Range: 1.9 km 
Weight: 2,948 kg (basic vehicle)  
Table 15.   ARTS Characteristics (From DoD, 2009; IHS Jane’s, 2010) 
b. Crusher 
 
Figure 6.   Crusher (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The Crusher is a large-wheeled combat UGV whose development is 
ongoing at Carnegie Mellon University (IHS Jane’s, 2011). First introduced in 2006, it is 
an improved version of the Spinner UGV, was used in the UGCV PerceptOR (Perception 
for Off-road Robotics) Integration (UPI) program, and was developed to demonstrate 
technologies for the Future Combat System (FCS) program’s Armed Reconnaissance 
Vehicle (ARV). Crusher was tested for mobility and autonomy between 2006 and 2008 at 
various sites around the U.S. (consisting of military bases/posts) where it traversed over 
1400 km (DoD, 2009; IHS Jane’s, 2011). 
Its payloads include a stabilized, remote-operated small-arms mount with 
Forward-Looking InfraRed (FLIR), a mast-mounted, stabilized remote surveillance and 
target acquisition sensor with FLIR, and day cameras. It has a suspended and shock-
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mounted steel skid plate which helps the vehicle to survive encounters with boulders and 
tree stumps. Forward of the vehicle are aids to help it survive collisions with similar other 
obstacles. Ground clearance is variable and the vehicle can rise up to 60 cm. It is a quiet 
vehicle since it has a hybrid electric drive system, where a 60 kW diesel engine charges a 
lithium ion battery. It boasts teleoperation and, according to the developer, full autonomy. 
It can also follow waypoints. Other characteristics are presented in Table 16 (IHS Jane's, 
2011). 
 
Height: 1.52 m   Max side slope: >30° 
Width: 2.59 m Curb clearance: >1.2 m 
Length: 5.1 m Gap clearance: 2.03 m 
Weight: 5,987 kg (unloaded) Turning circle: Zero 
Max speed: 42 km/h Max payload: 3,628 kg 
Max gradient climb: >40° Payload volume: 10.5 m
3 (main bay), 
4 m3 (front bay) 
Table 16.   Crusher Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
c. Gladiator 
 
Figure 7.   Gladiator (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
A large wheeled multipurpose UGV, The Gladiator is under ongoing 
development at Carnegie Mellon University. It will perform combat, logistics, demining 
and reconnaissance missions (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
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Its desired system capabilities consist of: 
 Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition using day and 
forward-looking infrared cameras, laser rangefinder, acoustic 
sensor and GPS 
 Obstacle breaching 
 Direct fire using M240G 7.62 mm machine gun and M249 5.56 
mm squad automatic weapon 
 Obscuration 
 Nuclear, biological and chemical agent reconnaissance and 
mapping 
 Transport for crew’s weapons, ammunition, supplies or wounded 
personnel (IHS Jane's, 2011) 
The desired system capabilities are further extended as follows: 
Other key desired system capabilities include 4.5-9 kg for the man-
wearable Operator Control Unit  (OCU), conversion from transportation to 
operational mode in less than 10 minutes, a unit price of USD150,000 
(2004), and that it be transportable by a MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, 
high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle, or a CH-46/CH-53 
helicopter. (IHS Jane's, 2011) 
Other characteristics are listed in Table 17. 
 
Height: 1.52 m 
  
Endurance: 
24 h; 8 h travelling and 
16 h stationary 
surveillance (desired) 
Width: 1.29 m Curb clearance: 40 cm (desired) 
Length: 2.03 m Max payload: 181 kg 
Weight: 1,270 kg Line of Sight: 1.8 km 
Max speed: 33 km/h (desired) 
Table 17.   Gladiator Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
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d. Mobile Detection Assessment Response System (MDARS) 
 
Figure 8.   MDARS (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
According to IHS Jane’s (2011), the MDARS, developed by General 
Dynamics Robotic Systems, is a large wheeled patrol UGV in service with the U.S. 
Department of Energy and the U.S. Army. It has completed 8,000 hours of operation and 
more than 45,600 km of security patrols since October 2004 at Hawthorne Army Depot 
(HWAD) in Nevada where it performed missions like intruder detection, lock 
assessment, and inventory control (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
The vehicle provides security and patrols DoD warehouses, airfields, 
ammunition supply depots, and port facilities. It can autonomously detect intruders to a 
range of 200 m and determine the status of inventory, barriers, and locks. For example, it 
can read 60,000 RFID tags affixed to sensitive/high-value stock and check 2,500 locks in 
a single-patrol shift. It can monitor radio-frequency (RF) tagged inventory and also 
determine if inventory has been moved and/or is missing from outdoor storage bunkers  
(IHS Jane's, 2011). 
MDARS has other features, such as: 
 Remote operation by joystick or autonomous, random patrol 
missions 
 Up to 16 MDARS vehicles can be controlled simultaneously by a 
single operator with a single station 
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 Equipped with real-time obstacle-avoidance systems and 360° 
sensors  
 Communications network of relay/repeaters installed on the 
ground provides redundant RF coverage of the entire patrol area 
(IHS Jane's, 2011) 
Other characteristics of the vehicle are presented in Table 18. 
 
Height: 2.62 m   Endurance: 
16 h without 
refueling 
Width: 1.64 m Max gradient climb: 30° 
Length: 2.92 m Curb clearance: 27.94 cm 
Weight: 1,360 kg Turning circle: 6.4 m 
Max speed: 32.1 km/h Line of sight control: 4,000 m 
Table 18.   MDARS Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
e. Multifunctional Utility/Logistics & Equipment Armed Robotic 
Vehicle - Assault (Light) (MULE ARV-A(L)) 
 
Figure 9.   MULE ARV-A(L) (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The MULE ARV-A(L) is a large wheeled multipurpose UGV. Its 
development is still ongoing at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control Systems.  The 
Multifunctional Utility/Logistics & Equipment (MULE) vehicle was a part of the FCS 
Program which had three variants, including a transport version (MULE-T), an Armed 
Robotic Vehicle - Assault (Light) (MULE ARV-A(L)), and a counter-mine version 
(MULE-C). The FCS program was canceled in 2009, so the only continuing development 
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of the MULE ARV-A(L) is under the U.S. Army's Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team 
(E-IBCT) program (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
The MULE ARV-A(L) is 6x6 with hub motors on each wheel. Articulated 
axles, attached separately to each wheel, can adjust wheel position in all three dimensions 
and enable the vehicle to maneuver over irregular surfaces like low walls. The vehicle 
can operate on as few as three wheels should one of the wheels or axles be disabled (IHS 
Jane's, 2011). 
The autonomous navigation capability of the vehicle was tested in a range 
of obstacle-crossing demonstrations in 2007 during which the vehicle showed it could 
overcome a 75-cm step and a 175-cm gap and could be expected to have a fording 
capability of 1.25 m. An M240 machine gun, Javelin missiles, and a sensor pedestal (with 
an electro-optical/infrared sensor), as well as other systems, are expected to be mounted 
on the vehicle. It can be transported by Lockheed Martin C-130 transport aircraft or 
underslung from a Boeing CH-47 transport helicopter. Other characteristics of the vehicle 
are presented in Table 19 (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
 
Height: 2.56 m   Weight: 2.5 tons 
Width: 2.24 m Side slope: >40% 
Length: 4.34 m 




Figure 10.   Talon (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The Talon, developed by QinetiQ North America, is a medium-tracked 
multipurpose UGV in service since 2010. It has been utilized in operations in Bosnia, 
Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, and during the September 11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Fukishima nuclear reactor meltdown. It was used in more than 20,000 
EOD missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Around 3,000 Talon are in operation all over the 
world, more than any other military robot. The United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia are currently using Talon robots. It has several versions, including a second-
generation Talon hazardous material (HazMat) robot for NBC detection role and an 
armed version called SWORDS (Special Weapons Observation Remote Reconnaissance 
Direct action System) (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
It can perform EOD, reconnaissance, communications, sensing, security, 
defense, counter IED, and rescue missions and perform missions in all weather conditions 
and at night. It is amphibious, transportable and has a self-righting capability and long 
battery life. The vehicle can be controlled by an OCU with a joystick for maneuverability 




A variety of payloads can be employed, including a night-vision camera 
with thermal and zoom options; chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN) 
sensor packages; counter-mine and counter-IED systems; gripper manipulator; smoke 
and grenade dropping modules; a breaching tool; anti-tank and light anti-tank weapon 
launchers; a 12-gauge shotgun; and mounts for various weapons. The Talon’s other 




0.42 m (arm 
stowed), 1.3 m 
(arm extended)   
Robot battery life: 
Up to 4.5 hours at typical 
operational speed with lithium 
ion optional battery 
Width: 0.57 m OCU battery life: Up to 4 hours with lithium ion optional battery 







Three infra-red illuminated 
cameras and auto-focus color 
zoom camera 
Max speed: 8.3 km/h 
 
Communication: 
Digital/analogue as standard 
provides a 500-800 m line-of-
sight range, an optional high 
gain antenna extends the range 
to 1200 m, and there is a fiber-
optic cable of 300 m or 500 m 
length 
Ground clearance: 0.07 m  Tow capability: 680 kg 
Horizontal reach: 1.3 m  Drag capacity: 113 kg (with Gripper) 
Payload capacity: 45 kg  Manipulator arm: 
Portable control station: Max lift capacity: 
Length: 0.48 m Extended: 4.5 kg 
Width: 0.40 m Unextended: 11 kg 
depth: 0.22 m Side slope: 45° 
Weight: 15 kg   
Table 20.   Talon Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
g. Dragon Runner 20 
 
Figure 11.   Dragon Runner 20 (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The Dragon Runner 20 (DR20), developed by QinetiQ North America, is 
a small wheeled or tracked reconnaissance and explosive defeating UGV in service with 
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the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Special Forces, the British Army, Special 
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) squads, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
teams (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
Its various missions include reconnaissance inside buildings, sewers, 
drainpipes, caves and courtyards; perimeter security patrol using on-board motion and 
sound detectors; checkpoint security; in-vehicle and under-vehicle inspections; and 
hostage and barricade reconnaissance and negotiation. One person can carry a DR20 in a 
standard-issue pack (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
Additional tracks can be mounted for mobility, and a manipulator arm 
with rotating shoulder, wrist and grippers can be mounted for additional capabilities. 
Also, a variety of disrupters can be employed with the manipulator arm. It has day and 
night pan/tilt/zoom cameras, motion detectors, and a listening capability that increases 
the unit’s situational awareness (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
The DR20 has field-changeable frequency capabilities that employ analog 
and digital radio options, standard batteries (that can be found in government inventory 
for the vehicle) and an easy-to-use operator-control unit. Operators can access four 
simultaneous camera views or any individual view. The DR20’s other characteristics are 
given in Table 21 (IHS Jane's, 2011).  
 
Height: 0.2 m   Endurance: 4-6 h 
Width: 0.38 m Max gradient climb: 40° 
Length: 0.84 m Curb clearance: 25.4 cm 
Weight: 10.4 kg Fording depth: 0.152 m 
Max speed: 16 km/h  Max total payload: 9 kg 
Portable control station:  Battery type: XX-2590 
Length: 0.55 m Manipulator arm: 
Width: 0.15 m Max lift capacity: 
Depth: 0.17 m Extended: 2.27 kg 
Weight: 3.17 kg Unextended: 4.5 kg 
Control link: Radio control Max length: 0.6 m 
Frequency: 5 GHz   Max grip opening: 25 cm 
Line of sight control: 600 m    
Table 21.   Dragon Runner 20 Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
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h. iRobot Packbot 510 with EOD Kit 
 
Figure 12.   iRobot Packbot 510 (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The iRobot Packbot 510, developed by iRobot Corp., is a small-tracked, 
explosives-defeating UGV in service with all U.S. Forces. It can be used for as bomb 
disposal (to identify and neutralize roadside bombs, car bombs, IEDs), checkpoints (to 
examine vehicles, packages and buildings in order to distinguish IEDs from harmless 
objects), inspections, explosives detection, and route clearance. It is able to ascend stairs 
and maneuver across uneven surfaces with the help of a set of polymer caterpillar tracks 
and an extra pair of caterpillar tracked “flippers” at one end (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
It has a variety of cameras.  The surveillance camera is a Charge-Coupled 
Device (CCD) with a 312 × zoom function with continuous pan and low-light 
capabilities. The operator can view forward, rear, and downward directions, as well as the 
manipulator position, with a wide-angle drive camera mounted on the base unit. It has 
two color cameras providing a view of the head from the manipulator's second elbow and 
the robot's position. Movement is primarily followed by the cameras on the vision and 
targeting head (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
The iRobot Packbot 510 is controlled by a portable command console 
using either a radio-control system or fiber-optic cable. The portable command console 
has a “gamepad” style controller with a command screen that provides feeds from the 
robot's on-board cameras and displays sensor information. There are manipulator 
positions set in advance and a 3-D visualization of the robot can be displayed. The 
robot’s other characteristics are given in Table 22 (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
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Height: 0.40 m (manipulator stowed), 2.21 m (manipulator extended)   
Power supply: 
2 × 30 Ah 12 V gel 
cell batteries on 
vehicle 
Width: 0.40 m (flippers off), 0.52 m (flippers on) Manipulator system (standard): 
Length: 0.81 m (flippers stowed), 1.01 m (flippers extended) Shoulder pivot: 220° 
Weight: 30.8 kg Elbow pivot: 340° (elbow 1), 340° (elbow 2) 
Max speed: 9.3 km/h  Lift capability: 
Command console:  Full extension: 4.5 kg 
Weight: 18.5 kg (with one battery)  Maximum: 13.5 kg 
Dimensions: 0.45 × 0.37 × 0.46 m (open)  Reach: 
Screen: 0.26 m, daylight readable  Horizontal: 2.03 m 
Length: 0.48 m  
Table 22.   iRobot Packbot 510 with EOD Kit Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
i. Multifunction, Agile, Remote-Controlled Robot (MARCbot) 
 
Figure 13.   MARCbot (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The MARCbot, developed by Exponent, is a small-wheeled explosive-
defeating UGV in service with the U.S. Army (IHS Jane’s, 2011). It is used to investigate 
suspected IED emplacements (DoD, 2009). 
According to the developer, its features include: 
 Remote observation distance greater than 100 meters  
 Low-light camera and LED arrays providing nighttime mission 
capability  
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 Pan/tilt camera that can be raised to a height of 3 feet and tipped 
forward as far as 1.2 feet for viewing the tops of boxes and looking 
into cans and over burlap sacks  
 Platform able to navigate most curbs  
 Powered by military standard x90 batteries (BB-2590, BB-390) 
instead of expensive, proprietary batteries  
 Low-cost platform intended as a disposable-type asset to address 
otherwise problematic technical support/logistics of complex, 
expensive robots 
 System cost less than $10,000 USD (Exponent, n.d.) 
Other characteristics of the MARCbot are given in Table 23.  
 
Height (Camera Arm 
Retracted): 34.2 cm   Weight: 11.3 kg 
Width: 48.3 cm Ground Clearance: 10 cm 
Camera height (extended): 61 cm Pan/Tilt Camera: 
Fixed-focus, high-
resolution, Low-
Lux, color camera 
Camera forward projection 
(extended): 35.6 cm Operator control unit: 
Max Camera Arm Height: 61 cm  Weight: 3.9 kg 
Table 23.   MARCbot Characteristics (From Exponent, n.d.) 
j. Recon Scout Throwbot 
 
Figure 14.   Recon Scout Throwbot (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
According to IHS Jane’s (2011), the Recon Scout Throwbot, developed by 
Recon Robotics, is a small-wheeled under-vehicle inspection and reconnaissance UGV. It 
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is in service with the U.S. military, the FBI, some U.S. police, several governmental 
departments in the U.S., as well as the UK police and military. It has several versions, 
including an under-vehicle inspection version (UVI), an infrared version (Recon Scout 
IR), an extra-terrain version (Recon Scout XT), and the Recon Scout Rescue version 
(IHS Jane's, 2011). 
The role of the vehicle is a stealthy reconnaissance first-responder or 
“first-in” system for hostage and military scenarios. It is a small and quiet robot that it is 
7 cm high and has a noise level of 20 dB. It is durable robot and can be thrown from a 
distance of greater than 31 m, or dropped from a height of greater than 9.1 m. It can be 
activated in ten seconds by removing the pin from the robot and turning on the OCU. The 
OCU can be operated with one hand (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
With its black-and-white image sensor, the operator can see a 60° view 
immediately and a 360° view in five seconds. A Command Monitoring Station kit 
(consisting of a high-gain antenna with tripod and mount, a video-receive module, cables 
and software) can increase the operating range by more than 300 meters. The other 
characteristics of the robot are given in Table 24 (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
 
Height: 0.07 m   Portable control station: 
Width: 0.18 m Length: 0.52 m 
Length: 0.07 m Width: 0.08 m 
Weight: 0.54 kg Depth: 0.03 m 
Max speed: 1.18 km/h  Weight: 0.79 kg 
Turning circle: Zero  Line of sight control: 
30 m (indoor), 91 m 
(outdoor) 
Table 24.   Recon Scout Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
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2. United Kingdom 
a. Cutlass 
 
Figure 15.   Cutlass on EOD Operations (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
According to IHS Jane’s (2011), the Cutlass, developed by Remotec, is a 
medium-wheeled EOD UGV used by the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) for anti-
terrorism operations. It has a modular design with the latest technology that can employ a 
variety of payloads, sensors, and tools. Its state-of-the-art gripper on the manipulator arm 
allows greater movement and agility inside limited spaces, like the interior of a car. It can 
move at slow speeds, yet accelerate fast for different sorts of operations, and it can 
operate in all weather conditions and all types of hard and soft terrain with its six-
wheeled articulated design. The other characteristics of the vehicle are given in Table 25 
(IHS Jane's, 2011). 
 
Height: 1.27 m 
  
Power supply: 
Lithium ion, nominal 40 V 
complete with battery 
management system 
Width: 0.72 m Number of cameras: 6, with picture-in-picture 
Length: 1.24 m Manipulator arm: 
Weight: 417 kg Max lift capacity: 
Max speed: 13 km/h  Extended: 2.27 kg 
Curb clearance: 0.12 m Unextended: 4.5 kg 
Fording depth: 0.50 m Max length: 0.6 m 
Obstacle 
clearance: 0.30 m Max grip opening: 25 cm 
Control link: 
Radio control (up to 1 
km) or fiber-optic 
cable (up to 500 m) 
 
Table 25.   Cutlass Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
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b. MACE Series of Vehicles 
 
Figure 16.   MACE 3 (From MIRA, n.d.) 
The MACE series of vehicles are large-wheeled multipurpose UGVs. The 
MACE 1 won the “Best Use of Autonomy” award at the UK MoD’s Grand Challenge in 
2008. The development of the MACE 2 and 3 is ongoing (IHS Jane’s, 2011). The MACE 
3 has command and control systems, as well as autonomous systems that were developed 
on the MACE 2 (MIRA, n.d.). 
A non-line-of-sight (N-LOS) control station on the MACE 2 allows the 
vehicle to be operated from a distance up to 5 km. The MACE 2 has tele-operational or 
semi-autonomous modes with on-board intelligence consisting of waypoint following, 
local obstacle avoidance, and haptic feedback. Cameras, on-board vehicle diagnostics, 
and GPS data contribute to the situational awareness of the operator (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
According to the developer, the MACE 2 has the following basic features: 
 Light-weight tubular frame with excellent torsional rigidity 
properties 
 Centrally-mounted TD4 100kw turbo-diesel engine with auto 
transmission 
 Distributed UGV control architecture employing MIRA Functional 
Safety Strategy 
 51
 One-ton payload capability 
 Improved medium mobility terrain performance 
 80 km/h maximum speed (MIRA, n.d.). 
The other specifications of MACE 2 are given in Table 26. 
Height: 1.3 m   Weight: 1,200 kg 
Width: 1.8 m Endurance: 193 km 
Length: 1.65 m Curb clearance: 26 cm 
Portable control station:  Max gradient climb: 45° 
Length: 0.50 m Turning circle: 2.5 m 
Width: 0.35 m Fording depth: 0.75 m 
Depth: 0.20 m 
Weight: 5 kg 
Table 26.   MACE 2 Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
According to MIRA (2011), the MACE 3 has tele-operational and 
autonomous modes. It can perform load carriage and perimeter protection mission and 
also be used to counter IEDs. Its basic features are: 
 Land Rover Defender chassis (all wheel base variants) 
 Driver position maintained if required 
 Distributed UGV control architecture employing MIRA functional 
safety strategy 
 Two-ton payload capability 
 Medium mobility terrain performance 






Figure 17.   GRUNT (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The GRUNT (GRound UNiTs), developed by Frontline Robotics, is a 
medium-wheeled patrol and surveillance UGV used by Canada and South Korea. A 
Mobile Autonomous Guard System (MAGS), including two GRUNTs that based on the 
Argo All-Terrain-Vehicle, a base station command and control system, and a complete 
software development environment were delivered to South Korea in 2005 by the 
developer. The vehicles included COTS sensors and the PC-104 industrial computer (IHS 
Jane's, 2011). 
The GRUNT can perform perimeter security checks and surveillance of 
critical infrastructure. It is an autonomous UGV that has radio communication systems, 
all-around imaging cameras, night-vision sensors, radar, and a continuous navigation 
system (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
A Frontline Robotics' Team Intelligence software platform, named Robot 
Open Control (ROC), enables fully autonomous operation and decision-making 
collaboration between GRUNTs. They can work together to identify an intruder and 
disturb and prevent intrusion, and they can observe security threats and communicate 
with personnel staying in a safe place. Other characteristics of the vehicle are presented 
in Table 27 (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
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Height: 1.91 m   Max gradient climb: 15° 
Width: 1.52 m Curb clearance: 25 cm 
Length: 2.79 m Turning circle: 2.79 m 
Weight: 450 kg Line-of-Sight control 2,000 m 
Max speed: 30 km/h  Frequency 2.4 GHz 
Endurance: Varies depending on mission  
Navigation System GPS, INS, FOG, 
magnetometer, 
odometry 
Max total payload: 771 kg   




Figure 18.   Guardium (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
According to IHS Jane’s (2011), the Guardium, developed by G-NIUS 
Unmanned Ground Systems LTD, is a large-wheeled patrol UGV in service with the 
Israel Defense Force (IDF). It was tested by Israel's Airport Authority in 2008, and the 
IDF has been deploying Guardiums along the Gaza border since 2011 (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
It can perform specialized missions including convoy security, 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and combat logistic support as well as regular missions like 
programmed patrols along border routes (G-NIUS Unmanned Ground Systems, n.d.; IHS 
Jane’s, 2011). In addition, it can autonomously respond to unscheduled events following 
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a set of guidelines programmed especially for the site characteristics and security doctrine 
(G-NIUS Unmanned Ground Systems, n.d.). 
The vehicle has payload that include a day/night camera, communications 
intelligence and electronic support-measures systems, a metal detector, and a 
communications/observation mast. The vehicle has a high-level of self-control (it can set 
its own route and overcome obstacles), and Guardiums can work together within a 
network (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
According to the developer, the vehicle has the following characteristics: 
Vehicle Level 
 Autonomous mission execution 
 Real-time, self-ruling, obstacle’s detection and avoidance 
 Proven safety system 
 Superb off-road maneuverability 
System Level 
 Easy to operate, dedicated command & control application in 
complementary operational versions: stationary, mobile and 
portable 
 Built-in debriefing and training capabilities 
 Variety of customer tailored wireless communication solutions 
Mission Level 
 Modular selection of payloads for comprehensive situational 
awareness and different mission requirements: EO/IR camera, 
Radar, Remotely Operated 
 Weapon Systems, Non-lethal Weapon Systems 
 Electronic Counter Measures, COMMINT, Hostile Fire Indicator 
(HFI), two-way audio link, CBRN sniffers, RFID Interrogator, fire 
extinguishers and more 
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 Stationary, Mobile and Portable control terminals (G-NIUS 
Unmanned Ground Systems, n.d.) 
The Guardium’s other specifications are given in Table 28. 
 
Height: 2.2 m   Endurance: 
24 hours and up to days of 
continuous operation 
Width: 1.8 m Max total payload: 300 kg 
Length: 2.95 m Turning circle: Platform dependent 
Weight: 1,400 kg Power Plant: Heavy and standard fuels’ engines are available 
Max speed: 50 km/h (in semi-autonomous mode)  





Figure 19.   Cameleon (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The Cameleon, developed by ECA Robotics, is a small-tracked 
multipurpose UGV used by France that can perform missions including counter-IED, 
EOD, route clearance, reconnaissance, first response, survey, mapping, and hazardous 
material operations. The following can be mounted on its manipulator arm: a gripper 
color camera with x40 zoom, a turret that has a color day/night camera with x4 zoom, a 
disruptor camera with lighting, and a chemical and radiological detector (IHS Jane’s, 
2011). The robot has other payloads that include a navigation module, sound detection, a 
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telescopic observation video camera, a smoke dispenser, gas and tears launchers, indoor 
localization and mapping, and dropping charge (ECA Robotics, 2011; IHS Jane’s, 2011). 
According to ECA Robotics (2011), piloting aid features include pre-
determined manipulator arm movements, SLAM cartography, indoor/outdoor 
localization, and a follower/leader module. Open architecture is dependent upon a Multi-
Agent System (MAS) that enables plug and play mission modules (ECA Robotics, 2011). 
The working range of the robot is up to 300 m with radio, but this can be 
extended 100 m on demand and up to 200 m with fiber-optic cable (ECA Robotics, 
2011). The command and control unit has a 26.4 cm touchscreen and two joysticks. The 
other characteristics of the robot are given in Table 29 (ECA Robotics, 2011; IHS Jane’s, 
2011). 
 
Height: 0.19 m   Max gradient climb: 35° 
Width: 0.50 m Curb clearance: 0.25 m 
Length: 0.67 m Turning Circle: Zero 
Weight: 25 kg Max payload: 20 kg 
Max speed: 6 km/h  Battery: Lithium ion, 32 V 
Endurance: 2.5 h  Manipulator arm: 
Portable control station:  Max lift capacity: 
Length: 0.23 m Extended: 3 kg 
Width: 0.40 m Unextended: 8 kg 
Depth: 0.65 m Max length: 1.5 m 
Weight: 3.2 kg Weight: 15 kg (without accessories) 
Frequency: 2.4 GHz Gripper: 360° rotation, 90° aperture 





Figure 20.   tEODor (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
According to IHS Jane’s (2011), the Telerob Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
and observation robot (tEODor), developed by Telerob, is a medium-tracked EOD UGV. 
More than 41 countries have bought at least 380 of these robots in the past decade (IHS 
Jane's, 2011).  
The key role of the robot is remote-controlled bomb disposal. It has a 
universal interface, allowing employment of standard ballistic systems, and 40 standard 
tools and devices can be used with the robot. The tEODor can employ up to five ballistic 
systems in parallel, with a maximum of 10 individual rounds. Aquaset, TEL220, the 
Remington 11-87 shotgun, Dynergit, Telemach, drills, grinders, laser aiming devices, 
window breakers, and various camera systems can all be used with the robot. The robot 
can operate in ambient temperatures ranging from -20 to +60°C. It has an integrated 
diagnostics system, which has a remote maintenance module used for easy analysis and 





Height: 1.1-2.8 m   Cameras: 
4 color cameras with 
lighting 
Width: 0.68 m Control: 
Radio control up to 1 
km distance, optional 
fiber-optic cable 
control 
Length: 1.3 m Manipulator arm: 
Weight: 375 kg Max lift capacity: 
Max speed: 3 km/h  Extended: 100 kg 
Max payload: 350 kg  Unextended: 20 kg 
Turning circle: 1.46 m  Max reach: 1.8 m 
Battery: Lithium ion  Tower rotation: ±205° 
Towing capacity: 3,000 N  Upper arm incline: +144°, -85° 
Scope:  Lower arm incline: ±110° 
Vertical: 2.8 m Lower arm extension: 39 cm 
Horizontal: 2.3 m Gripper incline: +120°, -95° 





part 2, 3, 4 and 
6 
better than 30 
V/m 
Gripper width: 30 cm 
Telescopic arm 0-0.4 m Gripper force: 600 N 
Table 30.   tEODor Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
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III. UGVS WITHIN THE TURKISH MND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, applied his 
intellect and abundant vision to the core values of the state, and Turkey, as a growing 
country, has remained a secular, western-oriented country since 1923. After its 
foundation, Turkey increased its efforts in international affairs and joined the United 
Nations (UN) in 1945 and NATO in 1952. The geostrategic location of Turkey was the 
main factor in its growing relationship with western countries, especially with the U.S., 
during the Cold War era. Turkey was one of only two NATO countries (the other was 
Norway) that had a common border with the Soviet Union. The Turkish Armed Forces 
was the second largest in NATO (after the U.S.), and its capability was a significant 
deterrent to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Turkey controls two straits, the Bosporus and 
Dardanelles, which provided the only available passage to warm waters for the Soviet 
Union’s fleet. These factors helped improve U.S.-Turkey relations. The Republic of 
Turkey has generally proven to be a valuable and steadfast U.S. ally (Robey & 
Voldermark, 2004).  
The Turkish-United States military and security assistance relationship is an 
important area of cooperation. The United States has provided nearly $13.8 billion in 
overall military assistance to Turkey since 1948. Turkey has increased its economic 
growth and military self-sufficiency during the last two decades, so most of the aid has 
been discontinued. Current annual military and security assistance can be seen Table 31 

































1948-1975 - 869.0 111.8 - - 3,406.0 4,386.8 185.0 
1976-1981 - - 3.4 - 1.0 10.5 14.9 952.9 
1982-1992 1,884.0 - 36.4 - 6.7 1,362.1 3,289.2 2,769.1 
1993-2001 - 205.1 14.0 0.1 3.2 - 222.4 1,678.1 
2002-2008 170.0 21.1 23.7 8.6 0.1 - 223.5 - 
2009 1.0 - 3.2 1.9 0.5 - 6.6 - 
2010 - - 5.0 3.0 - - 8.0 - 
2011 
Request - - 4.0 1.4 0.5 - 5.9 - 
2012 
Request - - 4.0 - 0.5 - 4.5 - 
TOTAL 2,055.0 1,095.2 205.5 15.0 12.5 4,778.6 8,161.8 5,585.1 
Table 31.   U.S. Military and Security Assistance to Turkey (Historical $ in millions)  
(From U.S. Library of Congress, 2011) 
U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation continues in the areas of increasing stability in 
the region and counter terrorism. In support of the War on Terrorism, Turkey wants to 
strengthen its Armed Forces by acquiring advanced military equipment from the U.S. 
government and private sector. It has sought to purchase UAVs from the U.S. since 2008 
for the purpose of increasing its effectiveness in operations against terrorists by using 
advanced aerial vehicles. The success of these vehicles in Afghanistan is a significant 
consideration. According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Turkey requested 
purchase of 10 U.S.-produced MALE drones, four Predators and six Reapers (U.S. 
Library of Congress, 2011). On the other hand, research and development (R&D) and 
prototype production processes in the Turkish defense industry are ongoing, and robotic 
systems are the current trend in the Turkish MND. According to yearly reports, there is 
an increasing interest in UGVs. Therefore, in this chapter, UGV efforts will be explored 
within the technology management strategy of the Turkish MND – after first providing a 
background of the Turkish Defense Industry. 
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B. THE TURKISH MND 
1. History of the Turkish Defense Industry 
The Ottoman Empire acquired and began to use gunpowder technology shortly 
after it was invented. Empire employed this technology to produce powerful cannons, 
used for the first time in a battle against the Karamanid dynasty, one of the Anatolian 
Beyliks and one of the most powerful states in Anatolia from the 13th century to 1487. 
Between 1450 and 1550, the Ottoman Empire had the best cannon systems in the world, 
in terms of technological proficiency and application skills. European states did not reach 
the level of this technology of the Ottoman Empire until the 17th century. Establishing 
armories in different cities to support battles, the Empire had more than ten armories 
throughout its territory (Beyoğlu & Kılıç, 2010).  
It also made great progress in the maritime arena. In 1081, the first Turkish fleet 
(50 vessels of 33 sailing ships and 17 oar ships), was constructed in the Smyrna shipyards 
under the order of Caka Bey, the first Turkish Commodore. During the 16th and 17th 
centuries, the Ottoman Empire had 140 shipyards (from the Suez Canal to the Danube, 
and from the Black Sea to Algeria) supporting a nearly 4,000-vessel fleet. In that era, this 
sea power provided sovereignty for the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. After the 
17th century, in spite of other advancements, technological progress in the western 
countries weakened the power and influence of the Ottoman Empire, and its Armed 
Forces became dependent on the European states in terms of technology, engineering, 
labor, and training (Beyoğlu & Kılıç, 2010). 
During the first years of the Republic established in 1923, there was no substantial 
defense-industry infrastructure. However, small-scale facilities producing light guns, 
pistols, and ammunition contributed to victory in the Independence War. Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, founder of the Republic of Turkey, declared that Turkey must develop its 
defense industry and sustain its economic growth, particularly in the private sector of 
business. From this standpoint, during the 1920s and 1930s, the government made 
ventures to establish a solid defense industry infrastructure, especially in the weapon, 
ammunition, and aviation sectors. During the first decade of the Republic, 
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industrialization was the policy focus of the government, and the defense industry was an 
indispensable part of this policy. Throughout this period, the Turkish Defense Industry 
reached its level of capacity producing aircraft. During the first 22 years of the Republic, 
a total of 17 facilities, including factories and shipyards, were set up, and a total of 112 
aircraft (including 15 German-patented Junkers A-20s, 15 U.S.-patented Hawk combat 
aircraft, and 15 Gotha communication aircraft) had been produced in the factories by 
1939 (Beyoğlu & Kılıç, 2010). 
World War II changed the political environment and power balances of the world. 
Turkey faced the spread of Soviet communism and became the focus of other countries, 
such as the United States and England. Monetary support under the Marshall Plan from 
the United States made a significant impact on the strengthening of the Turkish Armed 
Forces and increasing its deterrence against the Soviet threat. This support was provided 
as a donation; however, the maintenance cost to support the strengthened forces created a 
heavy burden on the Turkish budget. As a consequence, the new defense-industry 
infrastructure began to disappear: demand in the market began to decrease, so the 
factories lost their efficiency (Beyoğlu & Kılıç, 2010). 
Within their problematic region, Turkey faced crises during the 1960s. Events of 
the time, including President Lyndon Johnson’s letter of 1964, the Cyprus crisis, the 
Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, and the subsequent U.S. embargo against Turkey, all 
significantly affected the policy of the Turkish defense industry. It clarified without doubt 
that the national defense industry was vital to eliminating dependence on the defense 
industries of other states and to providing required material and systems to the Turkish 
Armed Forces. The development of a defense industry based on national resources was a 
necessity. In 1974, the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation was established with this 
understanding in mind, and several investments, though limited, were initiated. As a 
result, six defense companies were established between 1945 and 1975, and 25 new 
defense companies (among them some of the biggest defense companies in Turkey today) 
were established between 1975 and 1990 (Beyoğlu & Kılıç, 2010). 
The acquisition methods used by the Turkish MND were to both receive used 
MDSs as donations and procure MDSs as required. Foreign Military Sales and donations 
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from Germany were two common sources in the procurement of MDSs. This 
procurement method was used until 1985, when the Under Secretariat for Defense 
Industries (SSM) was established. At that time, the Turkish MND significantly changed 
its defense acquisition strategy, a shift that also facilitated the procurement of modern 
MDSs for the Turkish Armed Forces. Since the establishment of the SSM, private 
investments in the defense industry have increased. With the new acquisition strategy, the 
initial step was to establish joint ventures with foreign corporations. In the resulting 
projects, systems and sub-systems were manufactured under licensed contracts. The co-
production of the F-16 fighter aircraft was the first attempt to use this new strategy. Since 
the 2000s, the strategy has been updated because the establishment phase of the Turkish 
Defense Industry was completed. Today, the Turkish defense industry is maturing and 
has enough capacity to compete on the same scale as other defense industries by 
producing defense systems with unique designs. Figure 21 shows the progress of the 
defense industry based on acquisition strategy and number of projects (Beyoğlu & Kılıç, 
2010). 
 
Figure 21.   The Progress of the Defense Industry Based on Acquisition Strategy  
and the Number of Projects. (From Beyoğlu & Kılıç, 2010) 
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Figure 22 shows the progress of the defense industry based on acquisition strategy 
and contract price. 
 
Figure 22.   The Progress of the Defense Industry Based on Acquisition Strategy and  
Contract Price. (From Beyoğlu & Kılıç, 2010) 
2. The Under Secretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) 
The SSM was established in 1985. According to Law: 3238, it has two 
fundamental responsibilities: the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces and the 
development of the Turkish defense industry. The SSM is the most important stakeholder 
in the Turkish desire for an indigenous defense industry. Capability in this field would 
make Turkey less susceptible to foreign pressure in the future. Furthermore, its other 
desire is to transition from being solely a buyer in the defense market to becoming an 
exporter of defense articles and services to other developing nations (Robey & 
Voldermark, 2004). 
According to the SSM Strategic Plan 2007-2011 (2007), the vision of the SSM is 
“to be the procurement authority leading the Turkish defense industry to be competitive,  
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integrated with the international market and able to introduce unique indigenous solutions 
in accordance with technological improvements to meet national strategic defense and 
security requirements” (p. 1). 
The mission of the SSM is “to meet the system requirements of the Turkish 
Armed Forces and those government organizations promote the national defense and 
security; to establish and implement strategy and procedures for the development of the 
defense industry” (SSM, 2007, p. 1). 
SSM’s values are: 
 Authority: An authority in defense industry project management 
 Capability based: Employed with competent and team-oriented 
staff 
 Transparent: Open to audit and supervision 
 Reliable: Ethically organized culture 
 Innovative: A dynamic organization, open to change and 
improvement 
 Objective: Decisions based on objective facts and analytical 
methodologies 
 Stakeholder oriented: Service based on expectations and needs 
(SSM, 2007, p. 1) 
The success of the SSM depends on the balance between the modernization of the 
Armed Forces and the development of the Turkish defense industry. The most timely, 
effective, and efficient method to meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces is to 
acquire off-the-shelf products or systems which are already certified. However, this 
method creates hurdles in the development of an indigenous defense industry (Bayar, 
2010).   
On the other hand, acquiring these products and systems from the indigenous 
defense industry will likely mean that Armed Forces will not have them in a timely 
manner. The SSM tries to balance these two significant factors in its strategies. In 2010, 
Murad Bayar, the Undersecretary for Defense Industries, evaluated the first 25 years of 
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the SSM in the periodical Savunma Sanayii Gündemi, in describing the current situation 
of the Turkish Defense Industry along the following lines: 
 The Turkish Defense Industry has reached the capability to develop and 
manufacture most of the major defense systems needed by the Turkish 
Armed Forces. The projects are planned as indigenous defense-industry 
programs in the initial phase of the acquisition process and the percentage 
of direct procurement from other countries is below 10%. 
 The Turkish Defense Industry is the biggest investor in the industries in 
spending over $500 million on R&D. 
 There are over 100 companies in the defense industry, and one of these is 
in the list of the top 100 defense industry companies in the world. 
 The export level of defense articles is very close to $1 billion, an 
important goal for a defense industry. It means that the armed forces of 
some other countries have begun to use ground or sea systems and 
electronic devices made by Turkey. 
 The Turkish Defense Industry made progress in integration with supplier 
companies and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) which 
produce unique design work or subparts of a defense system. 
 Universities and R&D centers are included to the R&D projects of the 
defense systems. Today, over 20 universities are working on future 
defense technologies  (Bayar, 2010). 
In the near future, the goals of Turkish Defense Industry are: 
 To complete the development and manufacture of such main defense 
systems as a Tactical Reconnaissance and Attack Helicopter (ATAK), a 
Turkish National Main Battle Tank (ALTAY), a Patrol and Anti-
Submarine Warfare Ship (MILGEM – Milli Gemi – National Ship), UAV 
(ANKA), an Observation Satellite (GOKTURK), and an Air and Missile 
Defense System 
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 To develop and manufacture a national indigenous infantryman combat 
rifle 
 To increase the number of companies from 1 to 3 on the list of the first 
100 defense industry companies in the world 
 To develop and manufacture articles which can compete with those same 
articles made in other countries 
 To increase cooperation with universities and R&D centers in order to 
strengthen the technology infrastructure of the industry (Bayar, 2010) 
In the long run, the goals of the Turkish Defense Industry are: 
 To design, develop, and manufacture a national indigenous combat and 
training aircraft 
 To be in the top 10 defense industries in the world 
 To make progress in the technology development infrastructure (Bayar, 
2010) 
The Turkish defense industry completed the first phase, establishment, in 25 
years. Moving forward, a professional approach should be used to reach its goals. 
Technology management strategy is an important part of this approach (Bayar, 2010). 
C. TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY OF THE TURKISH MND 
1. Overview 
International competition has triggered a race for technological superiority in 
military applications. Nowadays, MDSs are being manufactured with the latest 
technologies. Some new technologies in the civil sector have been swiftly implemented 
in military systems. Therefore, the main focus for defense and security has switched to 
technological and information superiority, a subject that should take a central place in 
strategic plans (Bayar, 2010). 
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According to its Strategic Plan 2007-2011 (2007), the SSM’s priorities are 
Procurement Management, Industry and Technology Management, International 
Cooperation, and Organizational Development. The strategic goals of the SSM are: 
 
Strategic Goal 1: To Improve Procurement Activities in Accordance with User 
Requirements and Industrial Goals 
 In order to enhance procurement management capability, project 
management processes will be improved. 
 In accordance with achieving user satisfaction, project cycle times 
(duration between kick-off and contract awarding) will be 
shortened. 
 Quality, test and certification activities will be improved and made 
timely and effective. 
 Decisions made in project management will be consistent with 
institutional strategies. 
Strategic Goal 2: To Restructure the Defense Industry to Provide Unique Local 
Solutions and Compete in the International Arena 
 Indigenous share in expenditures for Turkish Armed Forces’ 
defense equipment expenditures shall be enhanced. 
 Activities that ensure sustainability and improve efficiency in the 
local defense industry will be actualized. 
 Integration of SME’s and supplier companies to defense industry 
shall be enhanced. 
 It shall be ensured that R&D Roadmap and Network of 
Excellences’ operate effectively. 
Strategic Goal 3: To Participate Actively in Multinational Defense and Security 
Projects that Promote International Cooperation 
 By fostering specialization and encouraging local industry to take 
its place in the international supply chain, strategic cooperation 
efforts will be promoted. 
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 Turkish industry’s share in NATO defense projects shall be 
increased. 
 Export of defense and aeronautics products will be promoted and 
supported. 
 
Strategic Goal 4: To Improve the Organizational Structure 
 The Strategic Human Resources Program will employ highly 
qualified staff to provide necessary training, and a productive 
environment to maintain organizational loyalty. 
 Knowledge and performance based management approach and 
strategic management systematic shall be institutionalized.  
 Governance and security of information produced and the sharing 
of knowledge will be improved. (SSM, 2007, p. 2) 
By setting strategic goal 2, the Turkish MND put an emphasis on the 
technological infrastructure of the Turkish Defense Industry and issued its Technology 
Management Strategy 2011-2016. In this section of the study, we will explore the main 
lines of this strategy – with a focus on UGV efforts in it and in the defense industry. 
2. Technology Management Strategy of the Turkish MND 
The procurement percentage through the indigenous defense industry for the 
needs of the Turkish Armed Forces has reached 46%. However, dependence on the 
defense industries of other states continues for some critical sub-systems, components, 
and technological infrastructure. Turkey has experienced problems with the expansion of 
its technological infrastructure because of foreign government policies and restrictions. In 
order to solve these problems, the Turkish MND needs R&D projects focused on new 
technologies, which will make the purchase of systems from the indigenous defense 
industry a maintainable strategy (SSM, 2011). 
On the other hand, the Turkish MND must also plan and develop R&D projects 
that are focused on products that will meet the demands of the Turkish Armed Forces in 
the near future. From this standpoint, the technology management strategy of the Turkish 
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MND is focused on the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces and the technology 
infrastructure of the defense industry, taking into consideration competition and 
maintainability. It includes four main areas: new technology acquisition activities, R&D 
projects, a technology acquisition roadmap, and networks of excellence. To accomplish 
its technology management strategy, the SSM has a directive and promotional authority 
over the defense industry. Three significant criteria must be taken into consideration in 
the study of technology management, which has a product-focused approach in order to 
meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. These criteria are: 
 Compliance with the needs and goals of the projects 
 Expansion of the technology infrastructure for future technologies 
 Cooperation among industry, universities, R&D institutions, and SMEs 
(SSM, 2011) 
In the last decade, the prime contractor model has been used in MDS contracts. 
Within this model, illustrated in Figure 23, projects have been spread to the base (SSM, 
2011). 
 
Figure 23.   Prime Contractor Model (From SSM, 2011) 
In this model, large scale companies in the industry are the lead system integrator. 
SMEs and technology companies have responsibility for the development and production 
of the sub-systems and components. Universities and R&D agencies have responsibility 
for research in the basic and applied sciences and expanding the technology infrastructure 









Figure 24.   Technology Management Process (From SSM, 2011) 
As Figure 24 shows, the R&D process is configured independently from the 
acquisition process but is also parallel to it. R&D studies have been initiated to define 
requirements. They establish a base for projects, which will then be procured from the 
indigenous defense industry. With this approach, not only are the needs of the Turkish 
Armed Forces regarding timely MDS procurement satisfied, the technology infrastructure 
of the Turkish defense industry also expands. The critical sub-systems, components, and 
technologies are all handled in the technology acquisition roadmap. After the needs of the 
Turkish Armed Forces are defined, area specialists clarify the requirements. Throughout 
all of these processes, cooperation and knowledge sharing among the industry, 
universities, R&D agencies, and the SSM (defined as “Networks of Excellence”) are the 
fundamentals of this strategy (SSM, 2011). 
According to the technology acquisition roadmap, after the needs and the 
requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces are defined, the sub-systems, components, and 
related technologies are identified in order to expand the technology infrastructure of the 
defense industry (SSM, 2011). The practical method of the technology acquisition 
strategy is as follows: 
 
 72
 System, sub-system, component, and related technology areas of a 
project will be defined and updated according to new technologies. 
 The capabilities, infrastructure, and incompetence in the sub-
systems, components, and related technology areas will be 
determined. 
 Incompetent areas will be prioritized for attention. 
 According to the prioritization, an umbrella project will be defined 
to gain competence. 
 Network of Excellence will be used in this umbrella project. (SSM, 
2011, p. 22)  
According to the Technology Management Strategy 2011–2016 (2011) of the 
SSM, twelve technology areas have been selected to expand the technology infrastructure 
of the Turkish defense industry. The studies are going on within the Network of 
Excellence. The twelve technology areas are as follows: 
 Autonomous Behavior 
 Advanced materials 
 Space 
 Energy and propulsion technologies 
 Sensors  
 Modeling and Simulation 
 Electronic Warfare 
 Rocket, Missile, Torpedo, Mine technologies 
 Communication 
 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
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 CBRN Technologies 
 Micro and Nano Technologies (SSM, 2011, p. 31) 
The universities, R&D institutes, and SMEs in Turkey continue their studies and 
research efforts in these twelve technology areas.  
3. UGV Efforts in the Turkish MND  
Today, UAVs have proven their performance and success in the operational area, 
and many countries have increased investment in unmanned systems. Turkey is one of 
these countries. In Turkey, the initial interest related to robotics systems was in UAVs. 
The Turkish MND has initiated studies related to Autonomous Behavior technologies to 
develop an industry technology base—because of the potential benefits of UAVs in the 
operational area. In its Technology Management Strategy, the SSM has identified 
primary technology areas which will be developed under the Network of Excellence 
method. These areas include Autonomy, Artificial Intelligence, and Command & Control 
and Communication technologies (SSM, 2011). Furthermore, according to its 2010 
Yearly Activity Report (2010), the SSM signed contracts for the urgent UAV needs of 
the Turkish Armed Forces. At the same time, the SSM signed R&D and design contracts 
to improve its defense technology infrastructure (SSM, 2010).  
On the other hand, while there is a growing interest in UGVs, there are no signed 
contracts or activities for UGVs (SSM, 2010). Conceptual studies and research efforts in 
supporting technology areas are ongoing.  
4. UGV Efforts in the Turkish Defense Industry 
According to the Technology Management Strategy 2011-2016 (2011) of the 
SSM (and in parallel with technological progress in the rest of the world), Turkish 
defense companies are investing in the infrastructure of unmanned systems to improve 
capabilities in that area. They are trying to expand their supporting technology and know-
how infrastructure. The leading company in this research is ASELSAN, which has 
conducted research on two concept UGVs produced for homeland security purposes. 
Their areas of emphasis are patrol, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Alper Erdener, 
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ASELSAN’s lead systems engineer for unmanned systems, pointed out that the Multi 
Autonomous Ground-robotic International Challenge (MAGIC) 2010 competition4 (co-
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Australian Ministry of Defense), 
was key to developing the new systems’ autonomous capabilities (Williams, 2011). 
UGVs produced by Turkish defense companies are analyzed below in order to 
determine the current UGV capabilities of the Turkish defense industry. 
a. Izci 
 
Figure 25.   Izci (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
Izci, meaning “Scout,” is a medium-wheeled reconnaissance and patrol 
UGV developed by ASELSAN. It has a modular design, so it is suitable for a wide range 
of missions, such as asymmetric warfare, border surveillance, homeland security, 
logistics, perimeter patrol of high-value installations, observation, and reconnaissance. 
There are two options for controlling the UGV: drive-by-wire and remote control. The 
Izci has a 4 x 4 commercial all-terrain chassis. Advanced electronic systems have been 
used in development. They enable user waypoint navigation, avoidance and path-
following (under day/night and various weather conditions), obstacle detection, and 
secure data and video transmission. A low-profile, mast-mounted, two-axis stabilized 
package (that includes TV camera, thermal sights, and a 5.56 mm automatic weapon) is  
 
                                                 
4 It requires entrants to demonstrate the use of multi-vehicle robotic teams to execute an intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance mission in a dynamic urban environment. 
 75
mounted on the roof of the Izci. It has various sensors, including stereo vision, color 
camera, drive cameras, GPS, and meteorological sensors. Table 32 shows other 
specifications of the Izci (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
 
Height: 1.80 m   Fording depth: 0.28 m 
Width: 1.40 m Max payload: 200 kg 
Length: 2.60 m Portable control station:   
Weight: 400 kg Length: 0.51 m 
Max speed: 90 km/h Width: 0.40 m 
Endurance: 8 h Depth: 0.19 m 
Max gradient climb: 15° Weight: 15 kg 
Curb clearance: 0.28 m Line of sight control: 4 km 
Turning circle: 4.17 m   Frequency: UHF 
Table 32.   Izci Characteristics (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
b. Gezgin 
 
Figure 26.   Gezgin (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The Gezgin, meaning “Traveler,” is a medium-tracked reconnaissance and 
armed UGV under development by ASELSAN. It uses the same control system as Izci, 
and there are plans for it to be guided by either fiber-optic cable or radio. It has a built-in 
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collision avoidance system, a rear observation camera, a TV-camera sight, and 5.56 mm 
and 7.62 mm weapons. Its height, width, and length are 0.40 m, 0.50 m, and 0.90 m, 
respectively. The R&D phase is still ongoing (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
c. T-Robot 
 
Figure 27.   T-Robot (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The T-Robot, developed by KOMPOZITEK, is a medium-armed, tracked 
or wheeled, reconnaissance, EOD- and IED-defeating UGV. It has six cameras and a 
manipulator. The base platform is fitted with front- and rear-driving cameras and lights 
and a pan/tilt/zoom surveillance camera, as well as weapons, a claw, and aiming cameras. 
Weapon options are EOD and IED defeating disruptors, M16 5.56 mm rifle, M240 7.62 
mm machine gun, M82 Barrett .50 caliber semi-automatic rifle, and 40 mm grenade 










Height: 0.80 m (approx.)   Max gradient climb: 40° 
Width: 0.70 m Curb clearance: 0.15 m 
Length: 1.10 m Battery: Two 24 V gel batteries 
Weight: 150 kg Line of sight control: 250 m (radio frequencies), 100 m (cable) 
Max speed: 4 km/h Manipulator arm: 
Endurance: 2 h Max lift capacity: 
Portable control station: Extended: 15 kg 
Length: 0.50 m Unextended: 25 kg 
Width: 0.30 m Max length: 1.5 m 
Depth: 0.20 m   Max grip opening: 25 cm 
Table 33.   T-Robot Specifications (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
d. NAT II 
 
Figure 28.   NAT II (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The NAT II, developed by ELEKTROLAND, is a medium-tracked, 
explosives-defeating UGV. It is equipped with day/night cameras, a moveable robotic 
arm, pneumatic wheels, hydraulic and electric drive mechanism, and a rechargeable dry 
gel battery. The NAT II is capable of stair climbing with a max gradient of 40 degrees, 




water, and two-way communication for sound data and video. Its manipulator arm can 
carry 20 kg, touch objects 200 cm from the body of the vehicle, and carry a day/night 
camera. The R&D phase is still ongoing. Other specifications of the NAT II are shown in 
Table 34 (IHS Jane's, 2011). 
 
Height: 0.40 m (approx., chassis)   NAT II manipulator arm 
Width: 0.50 m (approx.) Lift capacity: 20 kg (extended, max) 
Length: 0.70 m (approx.) Reach: 200 cm (max) 
Weight: >100 kg Weight: 13.5 kg (including 6 kg balance weight) 
Max speed: 6 km/h Base joint rotation: 360° continuous 
Endurance: 2 h Shoulder joint rotation: 150° 
Max gradient 
climb: 40° Elbow joint rotation: 120° 
Gap clearance: 30 cm Wrist joint rotation: 150° 
Turning circle: zero Gripper width: 23 cm 
Battery: dry gel Gripper rotation: 360°, clockwise and anti-clockwise 
Fording depth: 20 cm   
    
NAT II portable control station   
Weight: 10 kg   
Line of sight 
control: 500 m   
Screen size: 15 cm       
Table 34.   NAT II Specifications (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
 79
IV. METHODOLOGY OF THE ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Having completed its establishment phase, the Turkish defense industry needs a 
competitive, well-structured acquisition system structured from the Turkish MND’s 
standpoint. The acquisition practices in progress parallel the progress of the defense 
industry. Based on our open literature research, we could not find any source explaining 
an analysis method that determines the requirements of an MDS in the Turkish MND’s 
acquisition system. Therefore, we chose another analysis method to get the answer to our 
primary research question: the “Analysis of Alternative” (AoA) model, which is an 
established method in the U.S. defense acquisition system. 
An important element of the defense requirements and acquisition processes in 
the U.S. defense acquisition environment, AoA provides information to a decision 
making authority to debate and assess a potential program’s operational capability and 
affordability. It also provides valuable information for the budgeting process (Office of 
Aerospace Studies, 2008). 
 According to the “AoA Handbook” (2008) of the U.S. Air Force: 
An AoA is an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness, cost, 
and risks of proposed materiel solutions to gaps and shortfalls in 
operational capability. AoAs document the rationale for identifying and 
recommending a preferred solution or solutions to the identified 
shortfall(s). Threat changes, deficiencies, advances in technology or the 
obsolescence of existing systems can trigger an AoA. (p. 5) 
AoAs help justify the need for starting, stopping, or continuing an 
acquisition program. They are done because decision makers need 
reliable, objective assessments of the options for providing required 
capabilities. AoAs identify potentially viable solutions and provide 
comparative cost, effectiveness, and risk assessments of each solution to a 
baseline; this baseline is typically the current operating system. (p. 6) 
In this chapter, we will introduce the AoA model, which we will use in the next 
chapter to make our analysis. The components of AoA are a concept of operations, 
required capabilities, capability gaps, threats, scenario, KPPs, MTs / MoEs / MoPs, 
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effectiveness analysis, risk analysis, and alternative comparison matrix. We will not 
conduct a cost analysis within AoA because the required cost data is not available. 
B. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES MODEL  
1. Concept of Operations 
Defining the concept of operations is the first step of AoA, and all of the other 
steps are structured according to this one. Military specialists generally describe 
operational concepts for three different periods: peacetime, contingency, and wartime 
(Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2011).  These operational concepts include the 
detailed alternatives of a specific operation for each period (Office of Aerospace Studies, 
2008). 
Evaluating the effectiveness, cost and risks of an alternative requires a 
significant level of understanding of the operations of the alternative. For 
each alternative, an operations concept must describe the details of the 
employment of the alternative, as it will function within established 
military organizations. (Office of Aerospace Studies, 2008, p. 20) 
The following list details many of the potentially appropriate issues an operations 
concept may discuss:  
 Deployment plans, including how the system will be deployed and 
its deployment schedule  
 When and how the system will be employed, including tactics 
 Logistics concepts for peacetime and wartime 
 Interoperability with other Air Force, sister service, and allied 
systems 
 Incorporation into existing organizational structures, including 
manpower impacts 
 The relationship of the concept of employment (CONEMP) to 
relevant Air Force (AF) or Joint Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
 Peacetime and wartime operations concept (Office of Aerospace 
Studies, 2008, p. 20) 
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2. Required Capabilities / Capability Gaps 
Capability is defined as “the ability to execute a specified course of action. It is 
defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of 
an initial capabilities document” (ARCIC, 2010, p. C-4). 
 According to the ARCIC (2010), capability gaps are described as “those 
synergistic resources (DOTMLPF5) that are unavailable but potentially attainable to the 
operational user for effective task execution. These resources may come from the entire 
range of DOTMLPF solutions” (p. C-4). 
3. Threats 
The DAU (2009) defines a threat as “the sum of the potential strengths, 
capabilities, and strategic objectives of any adversary that can limit or negate U.S. 
mission accomplishment or reduce force, system, or equipment effectiveness” (p. B-185). 
Common threat elements might include: 
 The enemy order of battle  
 Limitations on threat effectiveness, such as logistics, command and 
control, operational capabilities, strategy or tactics, and technology  
 Countermeasures and changes in enemy strategy and tactics in 
response to the new system's capabilities (i.e., reactive threats)  
 A range of threats to account for uncertainties in the estimates  
 A target set representing a cross section of all possible targets  
 Threat laydown showing potential threat systems and their location 
(Office of Aerospace Studies, 2008, p. 18) 
4. Scenarios 
After setting the threats, the different alternatives are considered. That study, in 
realistic operational settings, will provide reasonable comparisons of relative 
performances for different alternatives. The AoA does this by developing one or more 
                                                 
5 DOTMLPF stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel, and Facilities. 
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appropriate military scenarios. Scenarios define operational locations, the enemy order of 
battle, and the corresponding enemy strategy and tactics (“the threat”) (Office of 
Aerospace Studies, 2008). 
5. Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) 
KPPs are described in the DAU’s “Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms & 
Terms” (2009) as: 
Those attributes or characteristics of a system that are considered critical 
or essential to the development of an effective military capability and that 
make a significant contribution to the characteristics of the future joint 
force. A KPP normally has a threshold representing the minimum 
acceptable value achievable at low-to-moderate risk, and an objective, 
representing the desired operational goal but at higher risk in cost, 
schedule, and performance. (p. B-100) 
The AoA provides information for decision-making about the program. If the 
program is warranted, one of the main objectives of the AoA is to identify the KPPs 
(Analysis of Alternatives, 2005). 
6. Mission Tasks (MTs) / Measure of Effectiveness (MoEs) / Measure of 
Performance (MoPs) 
MTs are described as: 
Mission tasks are usually expressed in terms of general tasks to be 
performed to correct the gaps in needed capabilities (e.g., hold targets at 
risk, or communicate in a jamming environment). (DAU, 2011, p. 120) 
They are usually expressed in terms of general tasks to be performed or 
effects to be achieved (e.g., hold targets at risk, provide countermeasures 
against surface-to-air missiles, or communicate in a jamming 
environment). (Office of Aerospace Studies, 2008, p. 22) 
The “AoA Handbook” of Office of Aerospace Studies (2008) describes MoEs as: 
MoEs are a qualitative or quantitative measure of a system‘s performance 
or characteristic that indicates the degree to which it performs the task or 
meets a requirement under specified conditions. They are a measure of 
operational success that must be closely related to the objective of the 
mission or operation being evaluated. There will be at least one MoE to 
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support each MT. Each alternative is evaluated against each MoE, and the 
results are used for comparison among the alternatives. (p. 23) 
MoPs are described as: 
MoPs are typically a quantitative measure of a system characteristic (e.g., 
range, velocity, mass, scan rate, weapon load-out, etc.) chosen to enable 
calculation of one or more MoEs. MoPs may apply universally to all 
alternatives or, unlike MoEs; they may be system specific in some 
instances. In order to determine how well an alternative performs, each 
MoP should have a threshold value. (Office of Aerospace Studies, 2008, p. 
24) 
7. Effectiveness Analysis 
Effectiveness Analysis is described in the “AoA Handbook” of Office of 
Aerospace Studies (2008) as “the most complex element of the AoA and consumes a 
significant fraction of AoA resources. The goal of the effectiveness analysis is to 
determine the military worth of the alternatives in performing mission tasks (MTs)”  
(p. 21). 
Effectiveness analysis is used to compare the alternatives dependent upon their 
military worth. It includes, and is affected by, MTs, MoEs, MoPs, alternatives, operations 
concept, threats, scenarios, study schedule, and available analysis resources. The 
effectiveness analysis methodology must be systematic and reasonable, and it should be 
straightforward enough that it does not contain any biases against any alternative (Office 
of Aerospace Studies, 2008).  
Most AoAs consist of analyses at different levels of detail. In the overall analysis, 
the input of aggregate analyses utilizes the outputs of more specialized analyses. At each 
level, appropriate models (simulation or otherwise), other analytic techniques, and data 
should be identified to establish the effectiveness of the analysis methodology. This 
identification should be based on the MoEs that were previously selected. The models 
should be used for the computation of specific MoEs (DAU, 2011). 
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8. Risk Analysis 
The “AoA Handbook” of Office of Aerospace Studies (2008) describes risk 
analysis as “the likelihood of an adverse event and the severity of the consequences 
should that event occur. The first step in risk analysis process is to determine what 
factors, under each risk category, are relevant to each alternative” (p. 39). 
The following shows the potential factors of technological risks:  
 Technology maturity  
 Modularity  
 Open architecture  
 Extensibility (Office of Aerospace Studies, 2008, p. 39) 
 
Figure 29.   Notional Risk Assessment Matrix (From Office of Aerospace Studies, 2008) 
9. Alternative Comparison Matrix 
After all of the analyses have been presented, a summary lists the key points of 
each alternative side-by-side before presenting the conclusions and recommendations. 
This will ensure that the audience has a summary picture of the results in mind for the 




V. ANALYSIS OF THE BEST AVAILABLE UGV 
Based on Turkish efforts made in terms of UGVs, we will analyze in this chapter 
the Turkish MND’s UGV requirements to find out the best available UGV on the market. 
First of all, we will examine the needs of the Turkish MND, employing the AoA model 
and producing the concept of operations, required capabilities, capability gaps and 
threats. We will also explore a scenario and examine the KPPs and MTs / MoEs / MoPs 
for a UGV that the Turkish MND needs. Secondly, we will analyze the selected UGV 
alternatives, performing an effectiveness analysis, a risk analysis, and generate an 
alternative comparison matrix.  
A. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE TURKISH MND FOR UGVS 
1. Concept of Operations 
The Turkish MND has difficulty protecting military convoys from terrorist attacks 
in the southeastern region of Turkey, where terrorist attacks on convoys produced 
casualties and damage. A UGV should be capable of detecting enemy forces in that 
region and neutralizing threats aimed at convoys. Therefore, the UGVs under 
study/consideration would be deployed in the southeastern part of Turkey. 
The UGV must protect friendly forces, assist against terrorist attacks to the 
convoy, and conduct such missions as ambushes and security patrols. In security 
missions, the UGV might be used to explore places where units would be exposed to fire 
and to help prevent the enemy from taking action and observing units. In the event of an 
attack, it could help protect the units in the convoy by disrupting and causing harm to the 
enemy. Thus, a UGV would be beneficial for a better force protection posture of the 
Turkish MND (Computing Technologies, Inc. [CoTs], 2001). 
The UGV would give early warning to friendly forces if it detects any enemy 
presence. The leader of the convoy and the Combat Operation Center (COC) would 
receive real-time data collected by the UGV, so the commander would be able to make 
early decisions for the safety of the convoy while staying away from enemy strengths and 
exploiting enemy weaknesses (CoTs, 2001). 
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In addition, the UGV would perform scouting, screening, and reconnaissance 
missions, assisting in the exploration of primary roads, as well as such adjacent terrain as 
defiles and lateral routes. It would reconnoiter risky areas and points of interest where 
enemy forces might be contacted, scout planned routes ahead of the operation, and 
observe critical locations in the southeastern part of Turkey. Working together with 
reconnaissance units and UAVs, the UGV would transmit data to the leaders of convoys 
and to the COC in deep reconnaissance or advance force operations. Mounted and 
dismounted reconnaissance units would benefit from the help of UGVs, as the success 
rate of reconnaissance would increase (CoTs, 2001). 
The UGV should be able to both avoid detection by enemy forces with its high 
mobility and stealthy features – including a low visual, acoustic, and thermal signature – 
and be carried by a medium lift helicopter. The UGV must be compatible with 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) architecture and 
interoperable with current intelligence systems and UAVs (CoTs, 2001). 
2. Required Capabilities 
Able to perform RSTA missions with its beyond-obstacle detection and 
identification for navigating capabilities, the UGV would discover possible threats caused 
by the enemy. It should have the capability of operating under all weather conditions, day 
and night, in urban and rural terrain. It should also be capable of crossing ponds, lakes 
and other slow moving bodies of water and driving up to the speed of at least 100 km/h 
on roads and in open terrain (NRC, 2002). 
There are other demands. The UGV must be capable of autonomously preceding 
or following a unit leader or moving on a flank as ordered, and doctrine (tactics, 
techniques, and procedures), local terrain, higher headquarters’ guidance, and the leader’s 
order would set the standoff distances between the UGV and the convoy leader. Capable 
of sensing the position of the leader and the other vehicles in the convoy and perceiving 
the terrain, the UGV should be easily able to implement orders from the leader with HRI 
capability in its missions. With a sophisticated sensor package for alerting the unit of 
potential threats, making eyes and ears of the leader, and the capability of 360-degree 
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observation or still focus on a particular area, it would distinguish and communicate the 
presence of natural and manmade features, people, vehicles, obstacles and other objects. 
The UGV should be capable of transmitting all gathered information to both the leader 
and the COC (NRC, 2002). 
UGV reliability must be high. Also, the unit should be able to self-diagnose, store 
maintenance problems for conducting corrective and preventive maintenance after the 
mission, and report critical problems to the leader and the COC immediately (NRC, 
2002). 
The functions and basic capabilities of UGVs needed by the Turkish MND, as 
specified in the NRC report (2002), are given in Table 35. 
  
 88
Function Basic Capabilities 
Mobility  Operate day and night under all weather conditions 
 Crosses urban and rural terrain with same ability as section leader’s manned 
vehicle 
 Swims water obstacles without additional preparation 
 Variable speeds depending on situation but up to 100 km/h on roads or in open 
terrain 
Mission packages  Local and global terrain, vegetation, obstacle sensing 
 Highly sophisticated sensors and range finders 
 Highly sophisticated RSTA package; Highly sophisticated Automated Target 
Recognition (ATR) that can discriminate among vehicles (combat and 
commercial) and humans (friend, foe, and noncombatant) 
 Stealth capabilities that make enemy detection of any UGV very difficult  
 Non-lethal self-protection package 
Communications  Secure communication package forms basis for “electronic tether” 
control/information sharing between the UGV and human section leader 
 Near real-time transfer of sensor and other information to section leader 
Human control  Human very easily directs the UGV to new locations and describes tasks to be 
performed by UGV while en route and upon arrival at new location 
 Human monitors sensor and other input from the UGV 
 Actively makes go or no-go decisions on all UGV recommended calls for direct 




 Automatically moves in relation (precedes, follows, or on a flank) to manned 
vehicle as initially making directed; adjusts speed and movement direction based 
on terrain, vegetation, nearby vehicles, or other objects 
 Occupies and adjusts its precise location in stationary positions; ties in 
observations and fields of fire with adjacent manned or unmanned systems 
 Automatically calls for recommended direct or indirect fire missions when 
sensing an enemy 
 Senses when under attack from direct or indirect fire and takes appropriate 
action 
 Recognizes commands to change allegiance to a different human section leader, 
as necessary 
Other  High levels of maintenance reliability 
 Self-diagnosis and storing of anticipated noncritical maintenance problems; 
immediate reporting of critical maintenance issues to section leader 
Human support  No more than one assistant section leader and one maintenance technician both 
of whom ride in the manned section leader’s vehicle 
Table 35.   Functions and Basic Capabilities of a UGV that Turkish MND Needs (From 
NRC, 2002) 
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3. Capability Gaps 
a. The Turkish MND 
In mountainous southeastern Turkey, the Turkish MND has a limited 
capability to detect terrorists and counterattack the enemy. The MND most often detects 
the enemy with UAVs and intelligence sources, but without such help it is hard to detect 
small groups of people in the mountainous terrain and harsh climatic conditions of that 
region. These drawbacks also make military convoys vulnerable to the terrorist attacks, 
attacks which have become inevitable, most of the time, due to capability gaps in this 
area.  
In spite of the fact that Turkish Armed Forces have continued to conduct 
operations against terrorist groups in the southeastern part of Turkey, in August 2011, 
Turkey was hit with 23 terrorist attacks, second most in the world according to the Centre 
of Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) Agency’s Monthly Terrorism 
Report (2011). Eight clashes resulted in 7 deaths and 18 injuries. Terrorist IED6 attacks 
resulted in 14 dead and 46 wounded (Centre of Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism, 
2011). The trend of terrorist and IED attacks, and the percentage of IED attacks is shown 
in Figure 30. 
                                                 
6 a.k.a roadside bomb. 
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Figure 30.   Trend of Terrorist Attacks 
According to data pulled from Monthly Terrorism Reports, IED attacks 
constitute the most significant portion of the attacks. The main targets are logistic or 
personnel-transferring convoys. Attacks against these convoys are also conducted using 
mines. The incidents are devastating as the following accounts show. 
The soldiers, traveling in an M-113 armored personnel carrier scouting 
ahead of a military convoy, were killed near the town of Lice in the 
largely Kurdish southeastern province of Diyarbakir, on a stretch of 
highway linking the cities of Bingöl and Diyarbakir. Turkish Chief of 
Staff, General Ilker Başbuğ, told a press conference: "Our guess at the 
moment is that it was a homemade bomb of very powerful explosives. 
Most probably it was remote-controlled or detonated by cable." The 
attack, if confirmed, will be the deadliest by the PKK7 this year. Shortly 
after the blast, the military launched ground and air operations against 
PKK separatists. (IHS Jane's, 2009) 
The air strikes were in retaliation for an ambush by the PKK on a military 
convoy on 17 August, which killed at least eight soldiers and a village 
guard, although some estimates put the number of those killed at as high 
                                                 
7 According to the U.S. Department of State’s “Country Reports on Terrorism” (2007), the PKK 
































as 12. At least 14 soldiers were injured in the attack, which involved four 
mine explosions along the road from Hakkari to Çukurca in Hakkari 
province in the far east of Turkey, bordering Iraq and Iran. (IHS Jane's, 
2011) 
The Turkish MND, having recognized this gap in protection, has used 
UAV procurement to improve the strength of Turkish Armed Forces in the operational 
area. Although UAVs provide vital benefits in the operational area, it is not enough for 
the full protection of the convoys. Therefore, in order to fill the gap, the Turkish MND 
needs a medium to large, platform-centric, autonomous ground vehicle that can perform 
deep RSTA missions in the southeastern part of Turkey to detect terrorists. This UGV 
must protect military convoys from ambushes, attacks, mines, IEDs, and direct/indirect 
fire incurred by asymmetric warfare.  
b. UGVs 
Current UMSs do not fulfill the interoperability requirements of the 
Turkish MND since they do not have common standards in terms of cooperation between 
ground and aerial vehicles and the controllers of the vehicles. The add-on C2, 
intelligence, and sensor payloads go beyond the size, weight, and power (SWaP) 
limitations for present platforms. They do not allow for teams of manned and unmanned 
systems to work well together. Multiple UMSs cannot coordinate and work together in 
operations because they do not have the required level of autonomy. Current UMSs 
cannot perform continuous operations since they do not possess the essential endurance 
(ARCIC, 2010). 
UGVs are not able to support robust networks since they cannot fully 
transmit information and they cannot provide required capacity throughout the extended 
Operational Environment (OE). This affects the Common Operational Picture (COP) 
since it causes entire communications enterprise overload (ARCIC, 2010).      
The UGVs do not have the ability to provide sufficient standoff distance 
from threats in the OE. They also cannot provide necessary mobility and extended 
weapons effects against enemy forces (ARCIC, 2010). 
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4. Threats 
a. Threat to be Countered or Targeted   
Terrorists in the southeastern part of Turkey conduct standoffs, hit-and-run 
attacks, and ambushes. In small groups, they carry out attacks against military convoys 
using mines, IEDs, and direct/indirect fire. Zehni (2008) describes the threats and points 
out the difficulties. 
The PKK’s choice to use mountains at the common borders of Turkey and 
Iraq and Iran as a safe haven and as a front to conduct hit-and-run actions 
against Turkey was not an arbitrary choice. Throughout history these 
mountains have served as safe haven to bandits and smugglers, away from 
the reach of the central government’s authority. Their rugged character 
hinders transportation and communications networks, and the small 
villages are far away from each other. The PKK chose these mountains to 
exploit the natural structure of this region as a safe haven, as a liberated 
area to prove that it is in charge in the region. Especially under these 
conditions, “the security of the people must be assured as a basic need, 
along with food, water, shelter, health care and a means of living.” (p. 23) 
b. Threats to UGVs   
UGVs face physical destruction and neutralization threats from enemy 
forces in the form of sniper attacks, mines, indirect fire (rockets, mortars and artillery), 
and IEDs (ARCIC, 2010; CoTs, 2001). UGV sensors can also be targeted by direct-fire 
threats (CoTs, 2001).  
Enemy tactics such as camouflage, concealment, deception and electronic 
warfare can be used to neutralize or degrade the capabilities of the UGV. Enemy 
electronic warfare systems might detect the UGV due to its signature. Enemy forces can 
affect UGV data communication links through jamming, disruption, and/or exploitation 
(CoTs, 2001). 
5. Scenario 
In this scenario, Red forces are comprised of a squad including small arms and 
several machine-gun teams on the flanks. They are in stationary defensive positions.  
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They hide in defilade where they have good lines of fire. They have buried a mine in the 
road and expect the Blue forces, but they do not have any information in advance (Army 
Science Board, 2001). 
The Blue force is ambushed. The Blue force has a convoy of five trucks as well as 
an escort unit of an armored personnel carrier in a column formation. A medium to large 
platform-centric autonomous ground vehicle precedes the convoy. The armored 
personnel carrier travels ahead of the trucks. The convoy is moving through rolling hill 
terrain and a partially-developed road network. The area is mountainous and the road is 
narrow. The Red force sets up an ambush to disrupt the convoy (Starr, Johnson, & 
Dugone, 2004). 
The UGV detects the mine and identifies the Red force. It transmits the 
information to the leader of the convoy and the COC. Exposed to machine-gun fire, the 
UGV senses the attack and gives the first response to the enemy with its non-lethal self-
protection package. The UGV receives orders from the leader that it should find a 
position that allows for suppressive fire from the armored personnel carrier, neutralize the 
mine, and find a position that allows the Blue trucks to move after neutralization. The 
Blue escort looks for a covered position between the Red forces and the convoy, and 
provides the maximum amount of fire against the Red Forces. The UGV neutralizes the 
mine and finds a covered position while the Blue trucks continue to drive at the highest 
possible rate of speed. After the Blue trucks leave the kill zone, the UGV follows. Once 
the other forces leave, the Blue escort continues suppressive force, breaks contact, and 
leaves the kill zone (Hakola, 2004). The UGV transmits the information to the COC, if 
directed. Figure 31 depicts the convoy action against the ambush.  
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Figure 31.   Convoy Escort Actions against Ambush (From U.S. Marine Corps, 2001) 
5. KPPs 
KPPs are generated based on the needs of the Turkish MND. They are determined 
as a result of analyzing the concept of operations, required capabilities, capability gaps, 
threats and scenario. They are critical capabilities that the Turkish MND needs to protect 
military convoys from terrorist attacks in the southeastern region of Turkey. KPPs for a 
medium to large platform-centric autonomous ground vehicle are given in Table 36. 
 
KPPs Criteria 
Endurance 24 hrs. 
System Range 300 km 
Max Speed 100 km/h 
Payload fraction >40% 
Reliability .95 of failure free system over specified period of time 
Table 36.   KPPs for a Medium to Large Platform-Centric Autonomous Ground  
Vehicle that Turkish MND Needs 
6. MTs / MoEs / MoPs 
The MTs, MoEs, and MoPs are developed according to the needs of the Turkish 
MND for a medium to large platform-centric autonomous ground vehicle. They are also 
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determined as a result of analyzing the concept of operations, required capabilities, 
capability gaps, threats and scenario. They are presented in Table 37. 
 
MTs MoEs MoPs Criteria 
1. Mission Length Endurance Average mission hours >24 hrs. 
2. System Range Range Average range of system  >300 km 
3. Mobility Max Speed Average Max Speed >100 km/h 
Cross-country Average Cross-country 
Speed 
Average sustained 
speed of 60 km/h 
Fording Capability Average Water Depth >0.8 m 
4. Mission Packages Target identification % of correct target 
identification 
>95% of correct 
target identification 
Payload Capacity % of payload fraction  >40% payload 
fraction 
5. Communication Communication Range Average signal range >10 km 
Communication Failure % of time lost 
communications 




Average max number of 
systems in the network 
>2 systems 
including the COC 
and the leader of the 
convoy 
6. Human Control Directing the UGV % of time consistent 
implementing orders from 
leader 




7. Automated UGV Self-









% of time correctly 
following or preceding the 
vehicle  
>99% of time 
correctly following 
or preceding the 
vehicle 
Exposure to threat % of detecting direct or 
indirect fire 
>%95 of detecting 
direct or indirect fire 
Detect Mines and IEDs % of detecting mines and 
IEDs 
>95% of detecting 
mines and IEDs 
8. Other Reliability Probability of failure free 
system over specified period 
of time 
>.95 
Table 37.   MTs, MoEs, and MoPs for a Medium to Large Platform-Centric Autonomous 
Ground Vehicle that Meets the Needs of the Turkish MND 
B. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
In this section, we will perform effectiveness and risk analyses and generate an 
alternative comparison matrix. The AoA method showed that the current systems 
available globally do not fully satisfy the MoEs and MoPs developed for the 
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requirements of the Turkish MND because the technological advancements of supporting 
technologies do not completely support the needs outlined in Section A of this chapter.  
Viable alternatives selected by the analyses are the Izci (Turkey), MDARS 
(USA), the GRUNT (Canada) and the Guardium (Israel). These UGVs have real-world 
applications, and they have been chosen since their capabilities are similar to the needs of 
the Turkish MND. Among the UGV alternatives, only the Izci has completed its 
development, although it has not yet been fielded. The other alternatives have been 
fielded. The Izci is selected as a baseline, since it is a product of the Turkish defense 
industry. 
1. Effectiveness Analysis 
Effectiveness analysis is performed based on the scores of each MoE for each 
viable alternative. Also, the overall score is determined for each UGV alternative.  
First, the assessment of the relative dependence of relevant technology areas for 
the platform-centric autonomous ground vehicle is taken from the NRC (2002) report to 
weight the MoEs. Then, scores for each alternative UGV are assigned. The overall score 
for each alternative is then determined by weighting and summing the scores for each 
MoE: 
Overall Score = ∑ ௜ܹ ∗ ௜ܵ 
Where ௜ܹ is the weight of the i th MoE and ௜ܵ is the score of the i th MoE. 
Table 38 summarizes the NRC report’s (2002) assessment of the relative 
dependence of relevant technology areas. 
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Technology Area Need/Relevance 
Perception 
For A-to-B mobility 























Health maintenance 5 
Key to Ratings 
0 = no need, 1 = low need, 2 = below average need  
3 = average need, 4 = above average need, 5 = high need 
Table 38.   Relative Dependence of Technology Areas (From NRC, 2002) 
Table 39 shows the scoring values and weights assigned to each MoE. Weights 
assigned are based on the relative dependence of technology areas. The maximum overall 
score is 135. 
 
Table 39.   Scoring Values and Weights for Each MoE8 (From Holste et al., 2009) 
 
                                                 
8 “Payload Capacity” MoE doesn’t fully satisfy the “Perception” technology area. But, it is assumed 
that the “Perception” is the closest technology area to this MoE among the other technology areas.   
 Scoring Value 
MTs / MOEs Technology Area Weight Notes 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Mission Length Power/Energy 5       




Navigation 5       
2.1. Autonomous 
Navigation 





 Able to precede or 
follow the leader 
3. Communications Communications 3       
3.1. Communications 
Network 







 Comms network 
and HRI (able to 
respond words, 
whistle, and arm 
signals, etc.) 
4. Mobility Mobility 5       
4.1. Max Speed   km/h x<8 8≤x<15 15≤x< 40 40≤x< 80 80≤x 
5. Mission Packages Perception 5       
5.1. Payload Capacity   kg x<75 75≤x<150 150≤x<250 250≤x<500 500≤x
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Table 40.   Izci and MDARS Scores and Overall Scores 
 
MoEs GRUNT Score Weight Total 
Score 
Guardium Score Weight Total 
Score 







12 and 24) 
5 10 24 hours 





























3 3 9 




4 5 20 
5.1. Payload 
Capacity 
771 kg 5 5 25 300 kg 4 5 20 
 Overall Score 69 Overall Score 79 
Table 41.   GRUNT and Guardium Scores and Overall Scores 
Based on the scores, effectiveness analysis is conducted for each viable 
alternative. Results are shown in Table 42. 
MoEs Izci 
(Baseline) 
Score Weight Total 
Score 
MDARS Score Weight Total 
Score 






















3 3 9 
4.1. Max Speed 90 km/h 5 5 25 32 km/h 2 5 10 
5.1. Payload 
Capacity 
200 kg 3 5 15 139 kg 2 5 10 
  Overall Score 63 Overall Score 54 
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Table 42.   Effectiveness Analysis Results 
2. Risk Analysis 
First of all, criteria are developed to determine the impact and probability of the 
viable alternatives for conducting risk analysis. Table 43 explains the impact criteria and 
Table 44 illustrates the probability criteria. 
 
Impact Justification 
1 Minimal impact to Turkish MND in terms of satisfying the needs for the UGVs 
2 Low impact to Turkish MND 
3 Moderate impact to Turkish MND 
4 Moderate to High impact to Turkish MND 
5 High impact that doesn’t satisfy the needs of the Turkish MND. 



























     63 
MDARS      48 
GRUNT      69 
Guardium      79 
Criteria:  (x = Scores) Red: x≤2, Yellow: 2<x≤4, Green: x=5 
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Probability Probability of 
Occurrence 
Justification 
1 0%<X<10% Low probability due to proven technology  
2 10%<X<40% Limited probability  
3 40%<X<60% Moderate probability  
4 60%<X<90% Fair probability  
5 >90% High probability due to unproven technology 
Table 44.   Probability Criteria 
After the criteria are defined, each alternative is judged subjectively (relative to 
the criteria) to determine the risk. Table 45 summarizes the risk analysis of each viable 
alternative. The “Rationale” column presents a short explanation of the decisions used for 
the numbers assigned to the impact and probability for each UGV alternative. The 
product of the impact and probability scores is, basically, the number for risk. 
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No Alternative Rationale Impact Probability Risk 
1 Izci 
(Baseline) 
According to IHS Jane’s (2011), development of the Izci is 
completed. But, it has not been fielded yet. There are 
uncertainties about the reliability of the system, and 
technologies related to the UGV have not been proven in the 
field. 
The Izci is the closest system that fulfills the needs of the 
Turkish MND explained in section A of this chapter. It is 
capable of conducting missions including asymmetric 
warfare, border surveillance, homeland security, logistics, 
perimeter patrol of high-value installations, observation, and 
reconnaissance. 
2 4 8 
2 MDARS According to IHS Jane’s (2011), the MDARS is in service 
with the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Army. It 
has completed 8,000 hours of operation and more than 
45,600 km of security patrols since October 2004 at 
Hawthorne Army Depot (HWAD) in Nevada. Also, the first 
of three MDARS was delivered to the Nevada National 
Security Site (NNSS) in October 2010, according to the 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 
Therefore, the technologies are assumed to be proven in the 
field. 
In terms of the requirements, the roles for the vehicle 
include providing security and performing a patrol role for 
DoD warehouses, airfields, ammunition supply depots, and 
port facilities. Therefore, it is the furthest system with 
respect to satisfying the needs of the Turkish MND. 
5 2 10 
3 GRUNT IHS Jane’s (2011) shows that development of the GRUNT 
is completed and it is in service. A Mobile Autonomous 
Guard System, including two GRUNTs (that are based on 
the Argo All-Terrain-Vehicle), a base station command and 
control system, and a complete software development 
environment, were delivered to South Korea in 2005 by the 
developer. Therefore, the technologies are assumed to be 
proven in the field.  
It can perform missions including perimeter security and 
surveillance of critical infrastructure. Therefore, it does not 
fully satisfy the needs of the Turkish MND.  
4 2 8 
4 Guardium IHS Jane’s (2011) shows this UGV is in service with the 
IDF. It was tested by Israel's Airport Authority in 2008, and 
the IDF has been deploying Guardiums along the Gaza 
border since 2011. Therefore, it is assumed that it has 
technologically proven itself in the field.   
The Guardium can perform missions including patrol, route 
proving and convoy security, reconnaissance and 
surveillance, and combat logistic support. So, its roles are 
close to the needs of the Turkish MND.  
2 2 4 
Table 45.   Risk Analysis 
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Finally, the risk analysis is mapped onto a risk reporting matrix.  The matrix 
graphically shows where each viable alternative fell in the “risk space.” Figure 32 
presents this mapping. The level of risk for each alternative is reported as low (green), 
moderate (yellow), or high (red). 
 
Figure 32.   Risk Reporting Matrix 
3. Alternative Comparison Matrix 
The alternative comparison matrix is generated based on the results of the 
effectiveness analysis and the risk analysis. Critical and non-critical MoEs are determined 
according to the weights of each MoE. “Communications Network” is the only MoE with 
a weight of less than five, so it is regarded as non-critical. The resultant matrix is shown 
in Table 46. 
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Table 46.   Alternative Comparison Matrix 
The resultant alternative comparison matrix is constructed by applying the AoA 
method (without cost analysis). Among the viable alternatives, the Guardium is selected 
as the best available alternative in terms of satisfying the requirements of the Turkish 
MND. The ranking of other alternatives is from preferred choice to least preferred: the 
GRUNT, Izci, and MDARS. However, of consideration is that the Izci has not yet been 
fielded, so has not proven itself technologically in the field. 
The Guardium can only partially fill the capability gaps of the Turkish MND 
because its state-of-the-art technology does not allow a fully autonomous system, able to 
detect terrorists and take necessary actions in an operational environment. As technology 
advances, there will be much better systems to fill the capability gaps. 




































R Y G Y R Y 63 
MDARS R Y R R Y Y 54 
GRUNT R Y R G Y Y 69 
Guardium Y Y Y Y Y G 79 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This MBA Project focused on finding the best available UGV on the current 
market with respect to the requirements of the Turkish MND. UGVs can perform dull, 
repetitive, and dangerous missions, and they are also capable of saving the lives of 
military personnel in an operational environment. Today, countries have started to invest 
in UGVs. In Turkey, there is a growing interest in UGVs and supporting technologies in 
the Turkish MND and defense industry. 
In this study, first of all, we introduced an overview of UGVs and then explored 
the concept of unmanned vehicles and UGVs, as well as their types and supporting 
technology areas. We conducted market research and gave examples of UGVs from the 
current market of selected countries. After we explored UGVs, we recognized that the 
most important challenge with the supporting technologies for unmanned ground systems 
is autonomy. A fully autonomous system has not been developed yet, and it is not likely 
one will be developed in the short term, as explained in Chapter II. 
Secondly, we explained the current UGV efforts within the Turkish MND. We 
provided a background and described the technology management strategy of the Turkish 
MND, introducing current UGV efforts in the Turkish defense industry. We showed that 
there is a growing interest in UGVs in Turkey and that Turkish defense companies have 
started to invest in the infrastructure of unmanned systems to improve capabilities. A few 
UGVs, such as the Izci, Gezgin, T-Robot, and NAT-II, have been developed or in the 
process of being developed. Despite these efforts in the industry, no signed contract 
exists, nor are there other UGV activities, in the Turkish MND.  
Thirdly, we introduced the AoA methodology model which is used in Chapter V. 
The AoA model provided the framework for determining the capability gaps and the 
requirements of the Turkish MND and the best available UGV in the current market. 
Finally, we performed an analysis to determine the best available alternative in 
the current UGV market with respect to the requirements of the Turkish MND. We 
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presented the concepts of operations, needed capabilities, capability gaps, and threats and 
then developed a scenario and generated KPPs and MTs / MoEs / MoPs. These steps 
provided the data we needed to determine the needs of the Turkish MND. We concluded 
that the Turkish MND needs a medium to large platform-centric autonomous ground 
vehicle that would protect convoys from ambushes, IEDs, mines, and direct/indirect fire. 
The Turkish MND has limited capability to detect terrorists in the mountainous areas in 
the southeastern region of Turkey. Terrorists there conduct standoff and hit-and-run 
attacks, inflicting losses and causing damage to military convoys. In order to fill the gap, 
the Turkish MND must employ a medium to large platform-centric autonomous ground 
vehicle that would protect convoys from these threats. 
Last but not least, we performed both effectiveness and a risk analyses, and 
generated an alternative comparison matrix. The viable alternatives selected for the 
analysis part of the AoA method were the Izci (Turkey), MDARS (USA), GRUNT 
(Canada), and Guardium (Israel). These vehicles were chosen due to their close 
relationship with the needs of the Turkish MND and because they have real-world 
applications.  
Once the effectiveness and risk analyses results were determined, an alternative 
comparison matrix was generated to compare the viable alternatives. The ranking of the 
alternatives are as follows, from most suitable to least suitable, according to the results of 
the matrix: the Guardium, GRUNT, Izci, and MDARS. It should be considered that the 
Izci has neither fielded nor technologically proven in the field (unlike the other UGVs). 
The results showed that the best available alternative in the current UGV market with 
respect to the requirements of the Turkish MND is the Guardium. This unmanned system 





B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
First, we recommend extending the market research. In this study, we conducted 
market research for selected countries—mostly developed countries. However, the 
defense industries of developing countries might provide unique, and possibly better, 
products.  
In this study, we realized that the defense acquisition system of the Turkish MND 
is still in progress, so we introduced the U.S. AoA methodology to perform our analysis. 
We recommend that a study be conducted to find the gaps and areas needing 
improvement of the Turkish defense acquisition system by comparing it with the defense 
acquisition systems of other countries.   
We performed an effectiveness analysis and a risk analysis in this study. For an 
effectiveness analysis, various tools can be used. The use of modeling and simulation 
(M&S) tools can be especially beneficial. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis can extend the 
robustness of the effectiveness analysis. In terms of risk analysis, we only focused on 
technological risks. This study could be further extended to consider programmatic and 
operational risks.  
Another important step in the AoA decision process is cost analysis. Cost analysis 
results are combined with the effectiveness and risk analysis results in the alternative 
comparison matrix. This study did not explore the total life cycle (LCC) cost of each 
alternative because of time and data constraints. Therefore, we recommend that this study 
be extended with an LCC analysis for each alternative so that more accurate results for 
comparison can be achieved. 
In this study, we realized there is no UGV on the current market that fully 
satisfies the requirements of the Turkish MND. At the moment, the best UGV (which 
partly fulfills the requirements of the Turkish MND) is the Guardium. This system should 
be procured to immediately close the capability gaps and should then be improved 
incrementally. Further research could explore the incremental development areas of the 
procured best alternative.  
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This study might also be applied to other research areas. These include: 
 Application of this study to UUVs, USVs and UGSs for the Turkish MND   
 Exploration of concepts in this study in terms of country interests, political 
issues, security objectives and improvement of the Turkish Defense 
Industry 
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